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NATO week in Azerbaijan

6-12 June, 2005



On 6-12 June 2005, the third year in a row “NATO Week” was held in Baky, Azerbaijan.

“NATO Week”, consisting of international summer school, workshop, and training dedicated to the Euro-Atlantic security and partnership issues, was organized with support of NATO Public Diplomacy Office.

Among these events, NATO International School in Azerbaijan (NISA) was held on 6-12 June. The main purposes of NISA were to bring together youth from NATO, partner and outreach countries, promoting

Euro-Atlantic values, consolidation of cooperation between young people at the international level and promotion of a dialogue between youth and personalities from NATO, Partner and outreach countries.

On 6 June a workshop on the “Protection and utilization of biological resources for a sustainable development” within framework of NATO’s Committee on Challenges of Modern Societies (CCMS) was organized by the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of the Republic of Azerbaijan. This workshop

brought together the experts from Azerbaijan and different NATO countries.

On 6-7 June training on the Planning and Review Process (PARP) implementation for Azerbaijani civilian and military experts was held at the Training Center of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The main objectives of this event were to ensure better understanding of strategic planning, the requirements and commitments of a Partner nation participating in the PARP, as well as to raise the knowledge and comprehension about PfP instruments and mechanisms.

Holding “NATO Week” in Azerbaijan was a sign of growing commitment of NATO to Azerbaijan’s security and independence. It also contributed to the rising level of knowledge among Azerbaijani students, as well as to general public awareness about NATO and its policy, and issues that NATO and Azerbaijan are dealing with together.



Opening speech by Mr. Araz Azimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan

Distinguished Ambassadors,

Dear guests,

First of all, I would like to thank you all for coming today to this inauguration ceremony.

Today is one of the most remarkable days during this year of cooperation between Azerbaijan and NATO. First, because today we start the NATO Week in Azerbaijan, already third year in a row. Second, because we have increased and somewhat diversified participation of the NATO school in Azerbaijan. Third, because of more growing interest to the NATO Week in Azerbaijan and especially to the NATO International School in Azerbaijan, the acronym of which NISA, probably is familiar to some of you as an Azerbaijani female name “Nisa”.

NISA shall be busy with rather robust things, because as outgoing generations already have contributed what they could. Now hopes are pinned with the young generation and at this point NISA is going to play a very significant role. I am not increasing the task to be put on the shoulders of NATO IS, but I think I would invite them to get embarked upon further developing this process. Because, NISA represents a small model of

Euro-Atlantic community with almost all members of NATO/Euro-Atlantic Partnership coming from different regions, what is important. I hope that Azerbaijani Government will increase its support to NISA, and we will try to institutionalize the school as such, therefore, lessening financial burden on NATO budget; but still counting on NATO’s support and intellectual contribution. I am also pleased to notice the presence of Ambassadors of NATO countries and Partner nations accredited in Azerbaijan here today.

NATO today is developing itself, as well as the international relations do not stand at one point. Things are changing and therefore, we all have to meet newly emerging challenges. There are different options in front of us: One has already proved to be an effective mechanism of providing trans-regional and intra-regional security links and cooperation; that is the process of enlargement. But still there are many other opportunities for those regions where NATO is not yet ready to embrace and to come into as major security architecture. Still there are mechanisms of partnership and even partnerships I would say, not only Partnership for Peace (PfP) but variety of mechanisms of interaction which

NATO is introducing starting with 2002 Summit in Prague. These mechanisms could be considered here in NISA.

Thinking initially about a major topic, a uniting ground for all topics within this one week long session of NISA School, I thought that the idea of 3 Seas linked and interlinked is a better thing to be addressed and to be acted through during the session. Because what we see today is exactly a geopolitically sound common space being formed and shaped in between Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Caspian Sea. Once you take a look at the processes, which are going on through these regions and basins you would recognize that there are a lot of similarities, although there are differences as well. You will recognize that NATO has established links with all these regions at different levels, with different grade of penetration and introduction into security challenges of those regions; sometimes being very pushy, sometimes very gentle. But probably, the interest on the other side, on the side of Partners proves one thing: Partnership is most needed and Partnership today creates that fabric-Fabric of security, fabric of cooperation among and inside these regions.



Opening speech by Mr. Araz Azimov, **Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan**

Of course, you may notice that EU is going hand by hand with NATO since the very beginning of the process of enlargement, partnerships and so on. And today, although this is NISA, not EUSA, I think still you can discuss the topics of European Union, which are rather challenging, which simply demand to be discussed these days. Reasons of EU constitution failure in France, or reasons of current fall down of euro, reasons of all these and prospects of all these integrational processes in European Union. Integration vis-a-vis disintegration; national vis-a-vis ultranational, these history long questions, these varieties of experiences. For some of you might be very useful to go back to the Soviet Union experience, and to look at that highly centralized conglomerate of countries, which simply then collapsed. Today, are we in EU witnessing this process or we still may hope that EU will follow another pattern? Should we forget about constitution, move on with somewhat adjusting integrational processes, somewhat downsizing pressures of ultrationals over nationals or vice versa? So, differences in opinions, but a lot of things will depend upon interrelationship between NATO and EU. You may find out different operations, which in Bosnia, in Balkans were carried on initially by NATO then passed on over to EU. You may look into experiences of these operations, their successes and failures. You can also consider a possibility of

synergy between partnerships, like partners of NATO and Partners of EU. They are similar, the same countries participate in these two frameworks, one is about hard security, and another one is soft. So, partner nations could contribute into EU operations like they do actually in NATO operations. May be these processes constitute two wings of one general process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

You could also consider intraregional institutional cooperation, like the one GUAM represents. GUAM has taken a new breath these days, after 3 new Presidents came to power in some of GUAM countries and after fifth one has left GUAM, after long ups and downs of and some doubts on probably GUAM has got more strength. GUAM is ready to cooperate with NATO as well. There are many promising topics and spheres for cooperation. But I think that transportation corridors, their security, their effective functioning is one of most important and inclusive ones. Because if you look at the Euro-Atlantic area today all of these territories are corridors in a way, there are ten transport corridors and six transport areas, if I'm not mistaken. So, this gives a reason to think about security in these transportation links. If you look at current map of operations of NATO and EU, you will see quite long distances between headquarters and immediate operation fields. So,

that demands probably effectiveness of corridors. And also we talk about integration, globalization, which also would dictate providing security in transport corridors, preventing that from use for undesirable purposes of proliferation, trafficking and other kinds of illegal activities. Look at GUAM from another angle and you will see that 3 of these countries are suppressed by conflicts in their territories and although some might consider conflicts being different I would say there are a lot of similarities and for that reason, may be GUAM is going to address these conflicts proceeding from one common position and that was declared at last the Summit in Moldova where four Presidents of GUAM spoke in favor of reintegration on the basis of democracy, stability and security, which altogether bring stability and progress. Reintegration to be understood as getting separatists controlled zones or territories back to the economic system, back to political system based on democracy, based on principles of regional and intra-regional integration and cooperation. Separatism can not go like that. It is contradictory to values of Europe, values of unification and integration. It can not go by further disruption of economic and political ties, which simply bring nothing good to anyone of parties in the conflict.

You also will have an opportunity to discuss partnership in development, in progress. From



Opening speech by Mr. Araz Azimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan

my point of view today we are at a very important and the same time challenging stage. We just started IPAP, saying we I mean not only Azerbaijan or Georgia. Saying we, I mean NATO and Partners, because its not one sided road, it's not a program of only obligations of one and luxury of testing by another one. I think that its two sided way of interrelations and cooperation and going back to what I've said in the beginning that Partnership creates the fabric of Euro-Atlantic security today, I'm sure that today Partners can give more than they are expected. We do today things in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, although Iraq is not directly related but NATO also is acting in Iraq, as well as Azerbaijan is acting. Coalitions and changing geometries- these are issues altogether coming

across in one map of Euro-Atlantic security, which is indivisible. So, relations between Azerbaijan and NATO continue to be an important element of security not only in the Southern Caucasus, but also in a wider region of 3 Seas. Getting back to that point of Black, Mediterranean and Caspian basins. Look at BTC today: Baky – Tbilisi – Ceyhan pipeline, which is not simply a steel made tube within which oil is pumped through. It is a backbone of a new geopolitical link between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey and other countries to join next. It is East-West corridor backbone. It is a network or a basis for future network, which will interlink these basins within which of course, Turkey occupies a major role as a NATO member, but Azerbaijan, Ka-

zakhstan and Georgia are growing closer to that level of integrational operability and this interoperability will give Azerbaijan and NATO chances to increase effectiveness of reforms, of operations, of participation in variety of programmes.

Azerbaijan could go somewhere NATO can not go being Moslem and being secular. Of course, processes in Persian Gulf, in the Middle East are very complicated, complex, of different nature and different mentality. Mentality means a lot, but not that much to prevent interlinks, to prevent us from attempting to create a new regional security system. So, let's go ahead.

In the end of my intervention, I would like to wish NISA all the best and huge success.



CONCEPT PAPER OF NISA

The Concept of Three Seas: Caspian, Black and Mediterranean

North Atlantic Treaty Organization has undergone to drastic changes since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in terms of substance and composition: introduction of Partnership for Peace and EAPC; materialized stability and security in the Balkans; two ambitious enlargement programs; transformational change to have effective crisis management and response capabilities; last but not least fight against international terrorism, Operation Active Endeavor and Afghanistan mission. Among other things, Istanbul Summit has brought new dimension to already wide agenda of NATO under the Istanbul cooperation initiative by introducing more ambitious MD programme and Broader Middle East concept. In a nutshell, enlargement, transformation, partnership and operations being the cornerstone of modern NATO, drives it into the ambiguities of the new century.

Enlargement has proved itself as an galvanizing and stimulating factor for the development of free and democratic societies, including democratic armed and security forces in the regions starting from the shores of the Baltics ending in the Black sea. NATO in “26” proved itself that it is not only the matter of mathematics, but chemistry as well.



Against the background of transatlantic rifts and gaps, NATO has developed common political and military interoperability and as an Alliance remains committed to its core values. Missions like Afghanistan or others, “whenever and wherever required” necessitate mobile, survivable and deployable soldiers not on the papers, but on the short time notice alert status. Because contemporary threats and challenges like our messages, mails, money circulate so rapidly. Against this background, NATO Response Force came into the existence.

The Istanbul Summit reiterated that partnership and outreach remain key issues for NATO today and in particular after 11 September, with the South Caucasus and Central Asia coming to the fore, and now the broader Middle East and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) countries

shifting sharply into focus.

Istanbul Summit decisions (for example, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) showed that NATO is addressing additional heterogeneous states and regions, whose main preoccupation is not joining the Atlantic Alliance security structure and its values. This is something new for the Alliance, for which it is probably inadequately prepared structurally and conceptually.

It’s obvious that the integration of these regions (especially outreach countries) into Euro-Atlantic structures will not be easy and in addition to ambitious defense reform agenda, education, public information, and dialogue among youth are keys to success.

In this respect, Azerbaijani Youth Euro-Atlantic Organization (AYEAO) initiated the or-



CONCEPT PAPER OF NISA

The Concept of Three Seas: Caspian, Black and Mediterranean

ganization of NATO International Summer School in Azerbaijan with the participation of youth from Allies, Partners (especially from South Caucasus, Central Asia, Russia, Ukraine) and MD and broader Middle East countries.

Active Partner country Azerbaijan, although located on the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic zone has started functioning as a rear area in terms of projecting Western power and values along with security into the broader Middle East. Azerbaijan being a Moslem country, having strong secularity, sharing Western democratic ideas and bringing together Western and Eastern values and last, but not least, possessing the rich partner experience could play an exceptional role – the role of bridge between NATO from one side and broader Middle East countries from another.

By proposing the organization of NISA, AYEAO intended to bring closer together nearly 40 students, young scientists and researchers, mass media and NGO representatives and other youth from different NATO, Partner, MD and broader Middle East countries (Gulf Cooperation Council) to tackle the various subjects related to the regions located around 3 Seas-Caspian, Black and Mediterranean, which NATO puts special emphasis on today.

The purpose of this event was bringing together youth from NATO, partner and outreach countries, promoting Euro-Atlantic values, consolidating cooperation between young people at the international level and actively involving youth in this process.

The NISA aimed at establishing a dialogue between youth and personalities from NATO, Partner and outreach countries.

Following matters were discussed at NISA:

Eastern side of the Caspian Sea – Central Asia and Afghanistan. Central Asian region on NATO’s security agenda; Main security problems of the region; The impact of the NATO’s Istanbul Summit decision on shifting the focus towards CA on the region; NATO operations in Afghanistan and Partner contributions to these operations; Future perspectives of the region.

Western side of the Caspian Sea - South Caucasus. Partnership perspectives of the SC; IPAP/PAP-DIB mechanism and possible role for them to play in realizing the security sector reforms in the South Caucasus; Security problems of the region and analyzing the possible ways of their solution; How materialized renewal and refocusing document is in terms of hard security?

Black Sea region – Greater Black Sea region concept, NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine relations; New NATO members – Romania, Bulgaria and their MAP experience.

Mediterranean Sea – Mediterranean Dialogue and NATO’s outreach policy; East – West / Caspian – Mediterranean link – Baky – Tbilisi – Ceyhan project and participation of the Central Asia (Kazakhstan) in this project.

Broader Middle East region – Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI); Iraq and NATO’s contribution to peace and security in this country; How to make NATO more attractive in the region? Different perceptions and finding way out: it is not a machine of dominance and war? What is the added value of NATO in the Middle East? As a part of broader Middle East region, Azerbaijan’s possible contribution to the implementation of ICI.

During the NISA the participants had an opportunity to get information from the “first hands” and discuss thoroughly each of the subjects with the professionals. Key government officials and NATO experts dealing with the subjects were invited to give presentations at NISA. The participants had also benefited from the video-conference with ASG of NATO Mr. J.Fournet, which was organized within NISA.



NISA-2005 DECLARATION **on regional conflicts in the South Caucasus**

adopted by NISA-2005 participants on June 10, 2005

The whole period of the end of the last millennium and the beginning of the new one was highlighted by the transformation of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture that, in its turn, brought about a number of challenges as well as a host of opportunities to this broad area of shared values and common principles.

This still ongoing transformation that made the principle of the indivisibility of security fundamental for guaranteeing Allied security and building stability considerably widened the Euro-Atlantic area of values. This first of all implied the extension of the boundaries within which the challenges for the Euro-Atlantic security emanate from. We herewith seek to address the challenges in the South-Eastern periphery of the today's Euro-Atlantic architecture that manifest itself in the long-lasting territorial and ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus region. Despite provisional de-escalation, none of these conflicts, either the conflict be-

tween Azerbaijan and Armenia, or the conflict in Abkhazia, or “South Ossetian” conflict, has been solved so far. Herewith we emphasize the vital importance that insuring stability and security in this region has for guaranteeing Euro-Atlantic security and stability.

However, we admit that for the time being neither of endeavors of the Euro-Atlantic institutions and projects involved in promoting settlement of security problems in the South Caucasus could bring about tangible accomplishments in sustainable resolution of the regional conflicts. We, the young leaders of the XXI century, are eager to make our combined contributions to the process of de-escalation of the negative dynamics of regional security relation. For more effective results to be achieved in this respect, we are determined to:

emphasize the role and combine the efforts of the dedicated young Euro-Atlanticists from the whole Euro-Atlantic area in

resolution of security problems in the South Caucasus region;

promote better awareness among and convey the truth to the dedicated youth in the whole Euro-Atlantic area on the security problems in the South Caucasus region;

generate discussions and encourage constructive debates among the young leaders in the Euro-Atlantic area on the security issues in the South Caucasus;

emphasize the pre-eminence of the international principle of territorial integrity in resolution of the conflicts in the South Caucasus.

Herewith, we commit ourselves to combine our efforts towards bringing our humble inputs to the genuine settlement of the security problems in the South Caucasus region lying at the South-East periphery of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.



COMMUNIQUE

on the First Meeting of the YATA Working Group on the South Caucasus

1. On June 8, 2005 the YATA Working Group on the South Caucasus convened for its first meeting, within the framework of the First NATO International School in Azerbaijan (NISA) that took place in Baky from 6 to 11 June, 2005.

The First Meeting of the YATA WG on the South Caucasus, chaired by Hikmet Hajiyev, AYEAO activist, was attended by the following WG members:

Troels Sorensen, President, YATA

Murad Ismayilov, Secretary General, AYEAO

Narmina Mammadova, Assistant Secretary General, AYEAO

Hikmet Hajiyev, AYEAO

Rashad Shirinov, President, AYATA

Serdar Ozerman, Turkish YATA

Sergey Utkin, Chairman, Russian YATA

Representatives from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, USA, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Rus-

sia, Bulgaria, and Kazakhstan were also present in the status of observers.

2. Hikmet Hajiyev formally opened the meeting and welcomed the representatives and observers, and noted the importance of combining the energies of the youth in addressing the conflicts around the three Seas – the Caspian, Black and Mediterranean.

3. Troels Sorensen, President of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA), followed with the presentation of YATA, its major goals and activities, as well as future potential role it may and should assume in promoting Euro-Atlantic values throughout the respective regions and addressing the new challenges that the Euro-Atlantic community is facing in the new geopolitical reality. In this respect, Mr. Sorensen highlighted the processes that brought about creation of the YATA Working Group on the South Caucasus and urged the WG members to work more actively to have discussions and debates on the regional conflicts in the South Caucasus institutionalized within YATA framework.

4. Araz Azimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, gave a keynote address covering the current trends pertinent to the

South Caucasus region and highlighted major challenges that the region is faced with nowadays stressing the importance of security of the region for security and stability of the whole Euro-Atlantic area.

5. The main work of the YATA WG focused on defining the further steps that YATA and YATA national chapters are to undertake to address the regional conflicts in the South Caucasus region. In this regard, at the conclusion of the First Meeting of YATA WG on the South Caucasus the following issues were agreed upon:

- To appoint an agreed upon week when all the YATA national chapters will arrange a national South Caucasus debate evening dedicated to the conflicts in the South Caucasus and result in a declaration addressing these issues;
- To create a South Caucasus sub-section on the YATA WEB-site to incorporate:
 - *Information, links and articles on the issue;*
 - *Information on the latest developments in the region;*
 - *Information on the YATA activities pertinent to the issue;*




COMMUNIQUE

on the First Meeting of the YATA Working Group on the South Caucasus

- To arrange three conferences on the conflicts in the South Caucasus to be held in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia;
- To arrange an international YATA conference on the regional conflicts in the South Caucasus in the NATO HQ, or in a neutral (non-Caucasus) country aimed at:

- *creating constructive debate and dialogue within and among the civil societies within YATA framework on the issues of regional conflicts in the South Caucasus;*
- *enlightening the international community on the issues of regional conflicts in the South Caucasus.*

At the closing session, Hikmet Hajiyev formally closed up the meeting stressing the importance of the mission that the YATA assumed with regards to the South Caucasus and wished all WG members success in this respect.





COMMUNIQUE

on the First Meeting of the GUAM Youth Initiative Group

1. On June 9, 2005 the First Meeting of the GUAM Youth Initiative Group (YIG) was convened within the framework of the First NATO International School in Azerbaijan (NISA) that took place in Baky from 6 to 11 June, 2005.

The First Meeting of the GUAM YIG, chaired by Murad Ismayilov, Secretary General of Azerbaijan Youth Euro-Atlantic Organization (AYEAO), was attended by young representatives from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, as well as President of YATA Troels Sorensen. The representatives from the USA, Germany, Italy, Spain, Turkey, Greece, Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Russia, Bulgaria, and Kazakhstan were also present in the status of observers.

2. Murad Ismayilov formally opened the meeting and welcomed the representatives and observers, noting the progress that GUAM has made since its

inception and stressing the need for the creation of the youth dimension to this institution.

3. Galib Israfilov, Chief of International Security Division of Security Affairs Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, gave a keynote address covering challenges and other issues facing GUAM and current trends in its activities emphasizing those to which the youth can introduce the added value.

4. The main work of the YIG meeting focused on two key issues: the review of the challenges and opportunities that GUAM is facing in the contemporary international security setting, and initiating the GUAM Youth Organization (YGUAM).

5. At the conclusion of the First Meeting of GUAM YIG the following issues were agreed upon:

- *initiate the GUAM Youth Organization (YGUAM) aimed at combining the efforts and energies of the youth from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in addressing the challenges and other issues that GUAM is focusing on in its activities;*

- *arrange the YGUAM Constituent Conference in Baky by December 2005 to formally establish the GUAM Youth Organization.*

6. At the closing session, Galib Israfilov expressed his deep appreciation of the youth initiative and wished all success to its further development and practical materialization.

7. Murad Ismayilov formally closed up the meeting and expressed his strong belief in the success of the youth initiative and called upon the representatives to combine the efforts to achieve the goals set during the meeting.



NISA-2005 PARTICIPANTS

	John Marc – Secretary General of JEF, Belgium
	Ivan Vasilev – Bulgaria
	Troels Sorensen – YATA President, Denmark
	Sofia Kontara – Greece
	Levan Samadashvili – Georgia
	Elrid Wollkopf – Germany
	Elena Val – Italy
	Aynur Baymirza – Kazakhstan
	Fausla Simaityte – Lithuania
	Martian Mazureanu – Moldova
	Sergey Utkin – Russian Federation
	Zeynep Ershahin – Turkey
	Serdar Ozerman – Turkey
	Oleksandr Moskalenko – Ukraine
	Maryam Iman – USA
	Alisher Holmatov – Uzbekistan



NISA-2005

PARTICIPANTS



Azerbaijan

Ziya Gaziyeu – AYEAO President
Murad Ismavilov – Secretary General of AYEAO
Narmina Mammadova – Assistant Secretary General of AYEAO
Nabat Qaraxanlı – member of AYEAO
Fakhri Karimli – member of AYEAO
Kamal Abdullayev – member of AYEAO
Aygün Huseynova – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Nurlan Aliyev – Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ceyhun Atayev – United Nations Development Programme
Elvin Mammadov – Baky State University
Khuraman Hadjiyeva – Baky State University
Shahid Shukurov – Baky State University
Ramil Tagiyev – Baky State University
Vusal Mammedov – Baky State University
Mammad Aliyev – Qafqaz University
Joshgun Imanquliyev – Qafqaz University
Mujdat Hasanov – Qafqaz University
Shahla Balakishiyeva – Qafqaz University
Rashad Baratli – Qafqaz University
Nazim Dadashov – Qafqaz University
Gunay Gasimova – University of Languages
Sabina Ilizarova – State Oil Academy
Anar Rahimov – European House, Information Coordinator
Tahsin Ashurov – City College of New York



“Diplomatiya Aləmi” Xüsusi Buraxılış
“World of Diplomacy” Special Edition
NATO INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL IN AZERBAIJAN
6 – 12 JUNE, 2005



NISA-2005 PHOTOS







“Diplomatiya Aləmi” Xüsusi Buraxılış
“World of Diplomacy” Special Edition
NISA-2005 PHOTOS





“Diplomatiya Aləmi” Xüsusi Buraxılış
“World of Diplomacy” Special Edition
NISA-2005 PHOTOS





AZERBAIJAN AND NATO

MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION

Azerbaijan-NATO cooperation goes back to March 1992 when Azerbaijan together with the other 37 countries joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) that gathered in itself at the time 16 Alliance members, 15 states of the former USSR and the other countries of the former Warsaw Pact. After the Partnership for Peace was introduced in January 1994 as a major initiative by NATO aimed at enhancing stability and security throughout Euro-Atlantic area, Azerbaijan was in the first wave of the countries that responded to the invitation to join the Program by signing the so-called Framework Agreement on 4 May 1994.

Azerbaijan's firm decision to join PfP was followed by handing over of its Presentation Document to NATO in 1996 where goals and objectives pursued by Azerbaijan in cooperation with NATO and contribution committed by Azerbaijan to NATO-led peacekeeping operations were enshrined comprehensively.

Partnership for Peace has proved to be very successful in developing and promoting mechanisms for defence cooperation and military interoperability between NATO and Azerbaijan. Most notably PfP has developed practical tools allowing NATO



and Partner nations to engage in joint crisis management and peacekeeping operations.

In May 1997 when NACC was transformed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), Azerbaijan has become an active member of this body, which provides an important fora for discussions and consultations on political and security related issues.

Azerbaijan acts as a host of many NATO exercises and trainings to foster interoperability and mutual understanding between Armed Forces of Partners and those of Allies.

Cooperative Determination 2001 post/computer assisted exercise, which took place in Baky with participation of nine NATO and 11 Partner countries, was aimed

at improving military interoperability for crisis response operations.

NATO/EAPC seminar "Links amongst terrorism, organized crime and other illegal activities", which held in Baky in May 2003, served as an important venue for thorough discussions and exchange of views between diplomats, intelligence officers and militaries from NATO member and partner countries.

Since 2003 special week, rich of NATO/PfP related events and named “NATO Week”, is held every year in Baky. “NATO Week”, consisting of NATO Summer School, seminar and workshops dedicated to the issues of Euro-Atlantic security and partnership, is organized with the support of NATO Public Diplomacy Office.



AZERBAIJAN AND NATO MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL COOPERATION

In May 2004 the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan H.E. I.Aliyev paid his first official visit to NATO HQ. During his visit the President submitted the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) Presentation Document of Azerbaijan to NATO. Thus, Azerbaijan has become the second country presented its IPAP Document to NATO.

In November 2004 Secretary-General of NATO Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer paid his first visit to Azerbaijan. During the visit Secretary-General participated at the meeting of the Commission of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Cooperation with NATO and discussed the current situation and future perspectives of the partnership relations of Azerbaijan with the Alliance.



In June 2005 the IPAP of Azerbaijan was approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).



AZERBAIJAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS



On 23 May 1996 the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan submitted the presentation document to the Secretary-General of NATO, which stated that Azerbaijan would detach a light-armed company to PfP operations conducted by NATO.

The Peacekeeping Troop within the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan was established in 1997 in order to contribute in practical terms to peacekeeping operations. The Peacekeeping Troop participated in such exercises as “Cooperative Banners” (Norway, 1997), “Cooperative Best Effort”, “Peace Bridge”, and “Centerazbat” held respectively (Macedonia, Turkey and Uzbekistan, 1998), “Cooperative Best Effort” (Canada, 1999) and “Centerazbat” (Kazakhstan, 2000). Cooperation with NATO through PfP Programme to a

greater extent has helped to enhance peacekeeping capabilities of these forces and to train them in accordance with NATO standards and to increase the level of interoperability with the Allied forces. Taking into account the expanding relations with NATO, in 2001 the Peacekeeping Troop was expanded to battalion, which met NATO requirements. Currently more than 200 Azerbaijani peacekeepers are serving in three different international peacekeeping operations shoulder to shoulder with their counterparts from many other countries for the sake of peace and security.

Kosovo was the first test ground for Azerbaijani peacekeeping forces. Since September 1999 peacekeeping platoon of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan composed of 34 military person-

nel, as part of the Turkish peacekeeping battalion, has been serving in Kosovo under the command of NATO. Participation in KFOR has improved further professional skills of peacekeeping forces of Azerbaijan and ensured greater opportunities to get more closely acquainted with the command and control procedures of NATO and paved the way for contribution to future peace support operations. Azerbaijan has been among the first states joining the emerging coalition against terrorism following 9/11 attacks on the United States. It immediately made its airspace and facilities available for counter-terrorism operations of allied nation. Thus, Azerbaijan's determination to participate closely in the counter-terrorist coalition was followed by the decision to join with the peacekeeping platoon to ISAF consisting of 21 soldiers, one officer and one NCO in November 2002 with the aim of contributing to peace, security and order in Afghanistan. In August 2003 peacekeeping contingent of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan composed of 151 military personnel was sent to Iraq for participation in the operation conducted by the coalition forces for restoration of security and stability in this country.



ARTICLES ON EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY ISSUES

EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

Esed Huseynli *

As soon as the geopolitical and economical interest of different states clashes, national enmity, historical hostility, rapid armament, war threat and the elements such as terrorism, separatism and reciprocal disagreement exist in international relations, the main attention in inter-state relations is paid to security issues.

After the Second World War NATO emerged as a political-military bloc against Soviet Union, hence it was not considered as a regional security structure. After the “Cold War” and utter defeat of the socialist ideology NATO achieved its initial purposes and begun to enlarge sphere of its activity as a regional security organization

After the end of the bipolar confrontation, it was predicted that NATO would stop its existence (as Warsaw Pact), and this was quite logical. Although the threat of the total and nuclear war was over, the economic-political crisis, ethnic and territorial conflicts in the Central and Eastern Europe is continued to threaten stability in Europe.

With that end of view, the new strategic conception was pre-

pared in NATO’s London (1990), Rome (1991) and Brussels (1994) Summits. This conception consisted of transformation of NATO from military into security organization, strengthening Alliance’s political role and broadening cooperation with newly independent post-soviet countries.

However, as the others, the character of issues related to NATO also changed. During the past period, many considerations mentioned about NATO’s irrationality as a security system. The collaborator of research Institute on the Security issues of European Union Lindi French stated her opinion about solidarity, which was demonstrated after the 11 September: “The Allies decided to create coalition against terrorism. But, it didn’t mean that they wanted to be solidier with USA. The decision to create coalition of Allies against terrorism was not related being solidier with US. The main purpose was to preserve NATO’s existence. At the same time, Iraq events revealed that there is a disloyalty crisis within NATO.”

AT the NATO’s Summit of the head of states in Prague (22 November, 2002) the defense Minister of Great Britain Jeff Hun stressed in his speech the necessity for NATO’s response to challenges and demands of new

era. Of course, in addition to NATO’s political transformation, these changes also include operative ness, adoption and reduction of armed forces. There are several reasons for disloyalty, which appeared in the transatlantic partnership after the collapse of “Iron Curtain” in Europe. But, in my research I tried to investigate the necessity of NATO as a collective security system. During the Cold War there were only common interests of NATO states, but now, each region of Euro Atlantic have begun to follow its own interests. From this point of view, some questions such as, what role will NATO play in Europe security system and how it will response US’s national interests assumes actual importance.

Taking into account that security is a loose notion, I only stressed military aspects of European security.

Therefore, six objectives might be considered fundamental for European stability;

1. Avoid a new division of Europe with an alienated Russia. This remains a vital strategic objective. Maintaining cooperative relations with Russia is essential for European security while consequences of an alienated and hostile Russia could be unpleasant for both the Europe and the world. Today Russia economically de-

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depends on west. Oil and gas export is Russia's the major source of income and the role of western investments in the development of Russian economy is big. Russian resort to violence in Europe would freeze relations with the west including exports and investment plans. The cast to Russia would thus be inordinately high. But when we look at the last decade, we see that Russia has failed in transition to the market economy and establishment of democracy and the rule of law. On the contrary, social economic hardships have increased and a small group of oligarchs has seized control over the economy. It is obvious that west's attempts to democratize Russia have failed and Russia continues to pursue in its own path.

2. Support and enlarge Europe's stable liberal base. The deepest source of peace and stability in Europe is the community of liberal states based on democracy, market economy, the rule of law and social stability. Theoretically, we know that success of the integration processes is conditioned by the equal level of development of states. Therefore, the economic development of Central and East European states have to be supported for the sake of the European integration. The economic interdependence between the states creates common interests. Authors such as Joseph Nye and Ribert Kohen are of the opinion that, the economic interdependence between states can be guarantee for a fundamental peace.

3. Preserve the North America – European partnership. Historically the transatlantic partnership is young. It emerged during the Cold War, based on joint economic development and Soviet threat. The collapse of the USSR removed one key pillar, but the partnership remains important nevertheless. Because both continue to share the same economic and political base with transnational links generating deeper interdependence than over and same economic links create shared global security interests. On the other hand Europe remains dependant upon US security guarantees and military capability in the event of a revived direct military threat from outside. And EU and US are to of today's most powerful global actors whose relationship affects the world.

4. Manage violent instability affecting Europe. Policing violent instability along Europe's fringe has emerged as one of NATO's most visible tasks since the end of the Cold War. And since 1995 it has managed the actual enforcement tasks effectively. Here NATO is the key instrument, for which no substitute yet exist, and essential for European crisis management.

Peacekeeping and peace enforcement. While the EU is now endeavoring to develop capabilities in this field, they will remain weak for along time. For these missions NATO enlargement could have two positive consequences:

- Firstly, by increasing the international legitimacy of a given operation, since more states would be backing it and taking part. Nevertheless this would not significantly reduce the need for more basic international mandates for action;

- Secondly, by increasing pool of assets for peacekeeping missions, though this is already covered by current partnership arrangement. On the other hand, the enlargement would have the major drawback of weakening NATO decision-making.

5. Maintaining insurance against military threats. Despite the fact that the threat an attack on liberal European society was eliminated with collapse of Soviet Union, return of such a threat can not be excepted and a policy of insurance against this threat shall be pursued. Many authors in Europe are saying that this threat can be expected from the “Axes of Evil” and Russia.
6. One of the key notions for European security is denationalization of defense and security policy. After the World War I two attempts have been made to prevent a new war by creating a collective defense system. But the confrontation among the European countries at the time obstinated the realization of those attempts. But the threat of socialism was a great incentive for European states and US to unite their defense and security policies in the military organization - the NATO. Creating interdepen-



dencies has been the basis for NATO’s success ever since 1949. In the first 40 years of NATO the Alliance has established a degree of transparency, trust and cooperation among its members that has help to defuse intra-Alliance tension, to solve conflicts or even prevent conflicts from degenerating into war.

7. The enlargement of NATO towards East does not derive from only NATO’s need to East, but also East’s need to NATO. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, East European countries got their factual independence and entered to European scene as an absolute legal member of international relation. Attempts of European countries to join NATO can be explained as affords to be free from extreme military expenses and create suspicious condition for solving and realizing hard social, economic and political reforms and must be evaluated as the briefest way to integrate European structures. They see NATO as a guarantor of any unstable and risky condition. For them NATO is a guarantor of any unstable and risky condition.

Some experts alleged that the security of Europe was important for US when there was a Soviet threat, but after the collapse of Soviet Union, US mostly have tackled its own security issues and try to protect its national interests. Of course, we cannot put aside such consideration, because the volte-face in the international policy affects national

interests of countries. After the collapse of Soviet Union greet need for military security in Europe is relatively decreased and today economical competition and struggle against new threats display themselves vividly. From this point of view, Europe must not expect more care from USA related with European security and review its security freely.

At the same time I want to stress that after Cold War USA’s interest to Europe have not reduced, on the contrary increased and covered Central, Eastern Europe and Caucasus. NATO’s enlargement assumes vital importance for USA. Enlargement will influence NATO to commit its basic duties. At the same time, below- mentioned factors deem the enlargement necessary for US:

1. Enlargement of NATO will increase the US military presence in East Europe. During and after the Kosovo war, a part US troops located in Germany were dislocated to Poland and Hungary. As the alliance enlargement, the security of new members will make it necessary to locate US military forces in those countries.
2. Enlargement will broaden the sales market for US military industry. Because, modernization of the arsenal is one another requirement of member states in order to meet the technical interoperability with NATO forces. The new member will turn to American technologies when renewing their

arms arsenal. It must be mentioned that, in comparison with the preview year, the defense budgets of Czech Republic increased by 8,3, Hungary by 6,7 and Poland by 2,1 per cent in real terms in 1999. Poland has contemplated building its own aircraft factory or assembly line of Russian SU-39 and buying over 100 modern Western multi-purpose planes like F/A-18 Hornet, F-16 Falcon, Mirege-2000 or JAS-39 Grippen. The Czech Republic has decided to produce its own light combat aircraft L-159 (in cooperation with Boeing) to replace Russian Mig-21 and Mig-23s and buy from the same range of Western aircraft like Poland later.

3. Fostering US military presence in Central and Eastern Europe the enlargement will bolster US’s leadership.
4. Enlargement will be guarantor for peace and security in East Europe, at the same time will create auspicious condition for US investments.
5. Acceptance of Central and East European countries to NATO will prevent emergence of the second unwelcome force in the region.

As the result of the research on the topic it might be concluded that, enlargement of NATO which has assumed the responsibility for security in a wiser area after the collapse of the Soviet Union will be very important in terms of ensuring the peace and stability in Europe.



EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

Ellada Alishova*

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union has caused some of the most intense questioning of the transatlantic and intra-European security systems seen in recent years. In the United States, political leaders confront various formulas for how best to pursue American national interests in Europe—formulas that run the gamut from further reducing the U.S. troop presence in Europe to maintaining the current level of one hundred thousand troops and from maintaining the size of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at sixteen nations to either measured or rapid expansion of the Alliance's membership. This questioning is, in large part, a result of an ongoing process of redefining NATO's purpose in the absence of an easily identifiable, direct threat to its members' security. This process has been complicated by Allied efforts to deal with the tragic situation in Bosnia and the rest of former Yugoslavia; efforts to extend eastward the stability Europe has enjoyed in the Euro-Atlantic system; and efforts to address the Allies' security relationship with Russia and other former Soviet states, both as partners and as potential adversaries. What's more, many political leaders in the Alliance's member states, including those in the United States, are from a

new generation - a generation that has not had to establish a stable security system in Europe in the wake of war. Instead, this new generation of leaders responds increasingly to the inward-looking focus of its electorate and struggles to meet expanding social demands with declining resources. Some of these leaders sense that, at the least, some interests among and between the Western democracies may be diverging. Parliaments and publics in the NATO countries also question the reasons for maintaining the Alliance now that the Soviet threat is gone. Indeed, some Americans and Europeans see no threat to renationalize of defense policies in Europe—policies that have so often led to war in European history, if NATO's integrated defense policy should falter. A return to the competitive national defense policies of the past is not regarded as likely, though "why not?" is never explained. No need for continuing the U.S. role as a "balancing wheel" on the Continent is seen. NATO, the heart of the Euro-Atlantic system, has been viewed throughout most of its history as having been driven by an anti-Communist design or, more directly, by an anti-Soviet purpose. The Euro Atlantic security system is, however, based on something more fundamental: a common commitment to democratic government and market economics as well as a belief that the security of Europe cannot be separated from that of North America. These shared

values and the common recognition of a shared destiny both pre-date NATO and endure after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. They are the basis of not only NATO, the most successful defense alliance in history, but also the European Union, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe, the Western European Union (WEU), and the other institutions that have been so successful in Europe across the Atlantic, and in some cases, around the world. These values are the reason why Americans have fought two wars in Europe in this century and why, as the continuing U.S. troop presence in Europe guarantees, Americans are prepared to fight again. They are the bases to renationalize the European defense policies that permitted Germany to join Europe as a prosperous and democratic nation, and they have underpinned the longest period of peace in Europe's history. Finally, these values have provided the means of defusing potential conflicts between NATO members such as Greece and Turkey. Because those "present at the creation" of the Euro-Atlantic system and their European and American successors had the wisdom to transform and sustain their commitments into a powerful military and political alliance, it has not been necessary to fight in defense of a NATO member's territory. We must never forget that while NATO's military power deterred Soviet aggres-

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sion, the power of the ideas NATO and the West embody ultimately brought about the bloodless victory over NATO's chief adversary. NATO, and the solemn commitment it represents, has also been crucial in maintaining support in the United States for its continuing involvement in the geopolitics of Europe. To the American people, NATO is the bedrock of American involvement in the world. It has enjoyed, and enjoys today, an exceptionally high degree of support. That support is high not only in Washington but also among average Americans, as reflected in opinion poll after opinion poll. Without its treaty commitment to remain engaged in Europe, could the United States have avoided reverting to its historical isolationist tradition following World War II? Without NATO, would the United States avoid an isolationist stance in the future?

The Alliance, through its integrated military structure, through over four decades of training and working together, and through confidence in the availability of military resources to meet common security challenges, has also created a more efficient and less costly defense establishment for its members. The Gulf War was a tremendous success technically and otherwise because of the common training and interoperability of the member country forces that participated in that conflict. All NATO members enjoy reduced

defense requirements because they can draw on each other's assets for example, the Europeans can rely on U.S. lift and intelligence capabilities while the United States can continue to benefit from forward bases in Europe.

Americans and Europeans, as fellow members of the Euro-Atlantic system, should want all of these benefits to continue:

- credible deterrence against a resurgent threat from the East, the potential spillover of ethnic conflict on NATO's perimeter, threats from rogue states, and threats from potential nuclear proliferators;
- continued avoidance of a return to competitive national defense policies through an integrated Alliance defense policy;
- an efficient and less costly defense;
- the stabilizing effect of U.S. involvement in Europe;
- the advantages and leverage derived from the forward deployment of U.S. military forces as well as the European provision of both military forces and other support for global contingencies. (Can we truly vital interests in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East without the U.S. force presence in Europe?)

The NATO Summit of January

1994 was a milestone in this transformation. Without diminishing NATO's core mission - the collective defense of its members; the Allies resolved to project stability outward; to integrate the nations of the East into Western security, political, and economic institutions; and to find new and useful ways to cooperate with their former adversaries, thereby seizing the opportunity of making them lasting partners. NATO is in the process of creating a wider group of nations with a shared interest in a democratic and prosperous Euro Atlantic area free from external domination or threats. The December 1994 NATO Ministerial addressed head-on the question of NATO's enlargement, the profoundest measure of safeguarding stability that NATO could undertake, by assuring that NATO's core function as a defense alliance will remain unimpaired. In seeking to enlarge the area of stability that it currently ensures, NATO did not call into question the stability its members now enjoy. NATO is assuring that the process of enlargement promotes not only the security of the Alliance, as mandated in Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also the security of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. It has agreed that enlargement must enhance stability not only for members, both old and new, but also for nonmembers. The NATO Allies also realize the importance of extending Article V's security guarantee to other countries as well as the fact that



doing so requires approval by all sixteen Allies, including ratification by two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. Enlargement is a tough decision that should not be taken lightly. Those who urge rapid expansion should reflect carefully on whether two-thirds of the U.S. Senate will necessarily agree to extend U.S. and NATO protection to all nations that seek it. For these reasons NATO has recognized that the process of enlargement must be cautious, transparent, and well prepared. The enlargement of NATO is intimately related to both the expanding integration of Europe and the broader inclusiveness of European institutions that is so clearly underway. As part of the process of expan-

sion, and for its own sake, NATO members must work on Russia's relationship with the interlocking complex of Euro-Atlantic institutions, including, but not limited to, Russia's relationship with NATO. The results of the Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Budapest in December 1994, were major steps in this direction. Although all agree Russia must not have a veto over NATO decisions, including the expansion decision, all also agree that, for good or ill, Russia will remain a key element in the European security equation. It will be an element for stability only if its relationship with both the Alliance and its members is a

positive one.

Finally, NATO members must do, and are committed to doing, better at developing their capabilities in conflict prevention and crisis management, in both NATO and the other institutions of the Euro-Atlantic security and economic complex. The Euro-Atlantic security system is responding to the new challenges of the post-Cold War period. As it does so, it is preserving the benefits to renationalize defense policies, an efficient defense, and the transatlantic security link. These must be maintained, or the challenges of the future will be far worse than those of today.



EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY IN A NEW PERIOD

Khatira Museyibova*

Euro-Atlantic security structure was exposed to some shifts in the new period which followed the terror acts of September 11 and the Iraqi war. The structure of international relations itself was affected by new tendencies. September 11 illustrated the world two different processes: globalization and local clashes. In the world which was heading for unification, the dynamics of local and regional conflicts were developing, too. New character of terrorism of September 11 exemplified the double character of new period as on the one hand, it was product of local, regional problems, on the other hand consequence of requirement for a universe symbolized by the ideas and power of US. After the Iraqi crisis that affected deeply the relations among nations, Euro-Atlantic relations also entered in the new period and are characterized mostly by the disagreements and contradictions. The world order formed after World War II shifted; the structure of international law regulating these international relations was depreciated. Universal organization UN which composed the basis of this structure via concluding international treaties and controlling their enforcement was kept apart from the worldwide im-

portant conflict. Within Euro-Atlantic security organization, NATO, member-states dissented radically in their positions to the intervention in other state's affairs. The Iraqi war has also produced a different kind of a rift among transatlantic allies and the damage that it inflicted on Washington's ties to Europe proves to be lasting and irreparable. This rupture between US and Europe inflicted in its turn Euro-Atlantic security architecture, as one of its main components is transatlantic partnership. To understand this rupture we need to figure out its causes. Though Iraqi crisis was a catalyst for transatlantic dispute, contradictions between allies existed long before. Different authors imply various arguments as the causes of rupture: power asymmetry among allies, diplomatic ineptness of two sides¹, American hegemony etc². Real asymmetry in power maybe exists, but power has different dimensions. If US exceed in political, ideological, especially in military power, European Union gradually challenges it as a leading trade union and political bloc. In the international realm when US embody military “hard power”, European Union is symbol of “soft power”. Its main forms of influence in world politics differ from those of US: economic

power, adherence to international principles, diplomatic regulation of conflicts, cultural influence etc. The advantages of EU are numerous: European Union prevails in economy as it produces 20% of world production (US 16%); EU is commercially independent and stable union, it is greatest trade bloc in the world (44% of trade circulation) and it attained considerable achievements in social politics, especially in the fields of education and public health³. European Union is proponent of diplomatic regulation of conflicts. The security conceptions of Europe and US differ a lot. American historian R.Kagan also argues opposing US's policy of detention and resort to force for the defense of its liberal order and security to Europeans that give preference to the world of “laws, rules, negotiation and international cooperation”⁴. US's security policy is one of traditional geopolitics, military action, economic support etc. But in Europe a different kind of process is taking place. Europe gradually transforms into a new type of state, Maastricht state, in which notion of sovereignty vanishes, economy internationalizes and borders become transparent. State governance is shared among local, federal, regional, European and international structures. In other words, Europe establishes a new model of international relations of 21st century. While in the “strategy

1 “Foreign Policy”, October 2003, <www.foreignpolicy.com>.

2 “National Interest”, Summer 2003, <www.nationalinterest.org>.

3 “США–Канада Экономика, Политика, Культура”, 2002, № 7, с. 7.

4 “L'Europe en crise, l'Amérique imperiale” Le Monde Dossiers et documents, Janvier 2004.

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of US’s national security” dated 20 September 2002 is stated that US unilaterally define which state endangers it and in that case US have the right of preventive actions for meeting the challenges⁵. This is another example of radical divergence in envisaging security problems which undermines the Euro-Atlantic security structure.

Different kind of discordances already existed between two sides of Atlantic Ocean before the debate about the run-up to war in Iraq. Mutual pretensions, disagreements, and distrust lead to the weakness of transatlantic partnership. Deep military and technological rift among allies, American unilateralism versus European multilateralism, different positions to international problems separate them. Main pretensions of US to Europeans concern their expending too little money for defense that they explain by economic difficulties, their military and technological capacity remains undeveloped, they share inadequately the burden in joint campaigns and they still keep relations with those countries that are against US (Iran, Libya). Its fact that during the transformation process of NATO in 90s and its adaptation to new world realities, its military forces and equipment were reduced considerably and large part of reduction shared Europeans. The operations in Kosovo, in Afghanistan demonstrated their military

weakness, in so far as 60% of air strikes in Kosovo and 92-99% in Afghanistan were realized by air forces of US. The rift in military and technological dimension is so deep that its elimination is not real in the near future.

Alternatively US’s unilateralism, freedom of actions without taking into account the interests of its allies, one-sided attitude to global problems lead to discontent of Europeans. New administration preferred the merits and effectiveness of unilateralism to the multilateralism. It took out of its foreign policy agenda issues like humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping operations, support to the international organizations, protection of international law etc.

As says R.Kagan: “American divide the world into good and bad, friends and enemies, while for the Europeans the world is more complex”.⁶ Unilateral actions of US followed the event of September 11: declaration of war against terrorism, transformation of this war into war in Iraq, other preventive actions like intervention for selfdefense, preventive war. After September 11, when a wave of support among Europeans encompassed Americans a good opportunity appeared for the reinvigoration of transatlantic relationship. But by declaring the war against terrorism, “crusade to Islam”, “enlargement of democratic zones”, “establishment of American he-

gemony” Bush administration lost this support.

As we mentioned there is great divergence among two shores of Atlantic Ocean on security issues, mainly on ensuring it. Though the perceptions of the main threats are the same, the forms of coping with them differ among allies. European states envisage the ensuring of their security through international institutions, treaties, and norms, but in case of US the priority is given to traditional forms like strengthening military power, elaborating new strategy, meeting challenges by military machine. But important differences existed long before war against terrorism and war in Iraq. These discordances concerned US’s renouncement of most of international initiatives and projects. Dispute between US and Europe concerned the adoption of Kyoto protocol, the participation in the International Criminal court, dissensions on treaties about biological and chemical weaponry and so on.⁷

Differences among allies were also intensified within NATO, Euro-Atlantic Security Alliance, and this was leading to the weakness of transatlantic security community. Crisis in NATO aggravated with the operations in Afghanistan, critics about the incapability of alliance in meeting new challenges like terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were actually

5 “Мировая экономика и международные отношения”, 2003, № 7, с. 33.

6 Ibid., с.32.

7 “Le monde diplomatique”, 2003, Mars, p. 14.



crisis in the relations of Transatlantic partners. As regards the resort of the European members of NATO to the article 5 of the Washington Treaty, it was pretty much for the fear of decline of North Atlantic Union than the fear of the West of September 11. It is fact that the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan involved only those states which merited US's confidence and NATO was not represented as a military and political whole. During the war in Iraq this confidence merited only Great Britain that was the sole proponent and state buttressing US's policy in Europe.

The question of usefulness of alliance, its capability of meeting new challenges (like terrorism, WMD etc.) was emerged after September 11. In fact, NATO seemed already irrelevant for the implementation of US's policy. As US wasn't willing to accomplish its conceptions, plans through the military bureaucracy of NATO and to meet on its way veto of member states. Nevertheless, regardless the ineffectiveness NATO as a whole military machine, it plays significant role as a political community. But if in operations in Afghanistan NATO maintained its political role, in Iraqi crisis its role was decreased to minimum. Regarding the capacity of NATO to address new challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, we must mention that this question aroused several times in the history of NATO. Every time,

facing the dilemma marginalization or modernization, NATO managed to meet the challenge and to transform and to adapt to new world realities by adopting new strategic conceptions, holding reforms in the structure of the organization etc. After the end of Cold war, when Warsaw Treaty Organization was eliminated, the same fate seemed to expect NATO. But in early 90-ies, important decisions were taken in Rome session (1991), meeting in Madrid (1997), Washington Summit (1999). The new strategic conception determined main goals and functions of the organization, main principles of activity in the new strategic realm and forms of counteracting new threats. New conception involved 3 elements: affirmation of mutual commitment in terms of collective defence, reinforcement of transatlantic partnership, improvement of defence capabilities to meet the new security challenges.¹⁸The adoption of new conception signified radical transformation of NATO as NATO found substantial reasons for *raison d'être*. After September 11 for the first time in the history NATO was activated for the defence of one of its members via the resort to article five of Washington treaty. But US didn't even accept the aid of its European allies, didn't apply NATO as an instrument for addressing the risks to its security and preferred unilateral actions. Unwillingness of US to use NATO was explained by the

necessity of holding together all the resources for the response to terror acts and by the effectiveness of doing it alone as attacks were directed to US. On the other hand, the rift between allies on military-technological levels engendered difficulties in delivering aid. Besides, NATO was considered by Washington as an incapable instrument in meeting new security challenges. It is fact that enduring necessity for adaptation to new world realities exists and it was highlighted in the latest meetings. Though to rebuilt the alliance two sides have to define common strategic purpose for meeting challenges and consolidating Euro-Atlantic community, real obstacles in achievement of these tasks exists. For instance, though USA and Europe are unified in defining main menaces to Euro-Atlantic security, they diverge radically in the interpretation of these challenges. The gap between allies in military technology means that military component of alliance as a whole virtually does not exist and taking into account US's relationship with its allies (unilateral actions, ad-hoc coalitions, bilateral relations with allies, not in the context of alliance) which leads to the erosion of political unity we can say that political component is also under question.

Thus, one of the significant components of Euro-Atlantic security architecture, NATO, faces another crisis in its history

⁸ "Washington Declaration", 23 April, 1999.



and to escape marginalization and save transatlantic community it needs once again reformation of its institutional basis. Along with the critics to the address of NATO like death of NATO, its inefficiency, there were talks about its transformation from military organization to political club. The fail of NATO as a military machine and the idea of its transformation to political-humanitarian organization is not real and is not yet on the today's agenda. But the idea of its transformation into political organization reminds of mini-UN or OSCE with gun and this feature can lead to the irrelevance of NATO as a stabilizing force of strategic situation in Europe and in the world.⁹ There are different approaches regarding NATO's modernization, enlargement and new missions: first, assuming that NATO must remain as a guarantee of peace in Europe and shouldn't transcend beyond its borders; second, that it shouldn't undertake new missions and new members; third, NATO as defensive component of transatlantic community must transform so that to be capable to meet new challenges.¹⁰ In any case, we must take into account that it is not the first crisis in the history of NATO. After the end of the Cold War it got a new breath due to embodying community of values and security interests of its members. It several times transformed, but it suc-

ceeded to be relevant for its member states.

The crisis in NATO, its incapability to meet new threats of the century and other factors formed the premises for the establishment of new security structure in Europe. On the one hand it stemmed from the necessity to form own European security structure for the protection of the stability, for safeguarding security in Europe. On the other hand it is a result of the new phase of European integration process that required security community of EU member-countries. Balkan crisis that revealed European's incapacity to handle the conflicts in their continent by their own forces without aid from abroad inflicted prestige of Europe in the world. After the end of Cold war when the need for American concern about European security disappeared, real opportunity emerged for ensuring regional security by EU itself. This factors and developing integration process gave impetus for the construction of common defence and security policy of European Union. Member-countries took measures for the promotion of new dynamics of EU in the common foreign policy and security sphere and the first steps in this way were creation of new structure in EU-Counsel for the coordination of foreign and security policy, formation of European mil-

itary forces etc. Initiative for the creation of defence community is not new and in the beginning of integration process there were different efforts like creation of West Union by Great Britain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg in 1948 that was named in 1955 Western European Union.¹¹ The idea of common European security and defence policy found its realisation in the late 90s when EU members took substantial actions towards its achievement. In the meeting of representatives of EU members in Kılın in 1999, member countries pledged to formulate the bases of common foreign and security policy of EU and in December in Helsinki important decisions determining European security were accepted. First, was defined establishment of European corps - European forces of rapid reaction composed of 60 thousand persons for the implementation of Petersberg missions defined in Amsterdam treaty of 1997.¹² Petersberg missions embodied humanitarian and rescue operations, peace building and peace-keeping tasks, crisis management and tasks of military forces for these missions.¹³ In a word, it meant that military forces regulating international conflicts should be directed by EU. Second, were formulated mechanisms of leading political and military bodies: committee on political and security issues; military committee, general

9 “Мировая экономика и международные отношения” 2003, № 1, с. 24.

10 “США–Канада Экономика, Политика, Культура”, 2002, № 7, с. 27.

11 Ibid., с. 17.

12 “Мировая экономика и международные отношения”, 2002, № 1, с. 19.

13 “НАТО” Справочник, с. 121.



headquarters. Establishment of these bodies do not imply creation of European army or unified European structure of military forces. This step entails realisation of some crisis management, peace building operations by EU relying on its own means and capacities. In the Summit in Brussels in December 2003 which was intended for the discussion of EU constitution ended with the crucial compromise of enabling Europeans with the capacity of military planning, holding the operations independently from NATO.¹⁴ Perception of the necessity for Europe to defend its interests autonomously founds ground gradually. Facing globalisation that undermines economic balances and that reveals new menaces Europeans should develop their capacities and find responses to the problems without their partner on the other side of Atlantic Ocean.

Different questions arise concerning perspectives of these new security structure, its efficiency and relationship with US, NATO. Establishment of European military forces, achievement of common foreign and defence policy embodying positions of all European countries do not seem plausible for today. New dynamic of EU in security and defence sphere requires a lot of time and primary preparations like elaboration of security conception, improvement of organisational structures, and de-

velopment of military potentials for the achievement of humanitarian interventions. The entrance of European integration to a new phase of common strategic autonomy opened great opportunities for EU to become one of the polar in the international relations. But developing independent foreign and security policy Europeans face the question whether they share collectively or not the ambition of Europe to become “Europower”.¹⁵

US’s attitude towards Europeans’ development of their own military capabilities is equivocal. On the one hand US always supported and encouraged reinforcement of European defence capacities and its attainment independence in meeting menaces in the continent. After the end of Cold War among US authorities there were persons criticizing the concentration of all attention in Europe and demanded its replacement to other regions like Pacific Ocean, South-east Asia. On the other hand, US were preoccupied with the risk of European concurrence with its position in the world. Europe has economic, commercial means, diplomatic and military priorities for countering US, but it needs this? US’s main pretension was that in the creation of military structures EU should refrain from 3D: duplication of NATO course of action; decoupling, US shouldn’t stay apart from European security

problems; discrimination against NATO members which are not members of EU.¹⁶

European Union’s military mechanisms and their relationship with NATO are indefinite, too. Of course, European foundation of military structures for the achievement of common foreign and defence policy will lead to the decrease of resources detached for NATO purposes. First times, it may even rely on the capabilities of NATO for the implementation of own anti-crisis operations. Within NATO different initiatives and efforts were undertaken for improving NATO capacities and strengthening European defence capabilities within NATO like enlargement of NATO, encouragement of partnership with non-member countries through different programs and so on. In a word, the aim was to focus European security within Euro-Atlantic security model in which main role plays NATO and thus, develop NATO-centred model of security. But a new type of security structure is emerging in the European scene, which have all chances to become significant actor and to compete with other institutions or even to replace them.

14 L.Zecchni, “l’Emancipation europeen inquiete Washington”, Le Monde Dossiers et documents, Janvier 2004.

15 “l’Europe en crise, l’Amerique imperiale”, Le Monde Dossiers et documents, Janvier 2004

16 “Мировая экономика и международные отношения”, 2002, № 1, с. 21.



PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: OUT OF AREA OR OUT OF BUSINESS

Murad Ismayilov *

This article tries to evaluate the success that highlighted the way the PfP accomplished the goals assigned to it in the context of the challenges that NATO was faced with in the immediate aftermath of the Cold war. Building further upon that success, the article tries to stress the new important role that PfP can and should assume in addressing the new challenges that the Alliance is faced with in the XXI century international security setting and the centrality of the role that the Partnership framework can and should play in assisting NATO to fulfill its major short- and long-term objectives.

Chapter I. Strategic rationales for and political implications of PfP

NATO former Secretary General Lord Robertson once said that the Partnership is “one of NATO’s gold-dust assets” and “one of the best investments ever for a future safer world”¹. Indeed, PfP proved an overall success in demonstrating how military tools and arrangements might be employed to influence political developments in Europe and its peripheries in the aftermath of the Cold War.

§1.1 PfP as a bridge towards

membership. The most tangible implication was that PfP served as a bridge towards eventual membership for already ten countries. Initially perceived as an initiative designed to postpone or even replace the issue of NATO enlargement, it actually served as an effective tool to “help prepare interested partners, through their participation in PfP activities, for the benefits and responsibilities of eventual membership”², and in that way it actually served to mitigate the negative aspects that the process of integrating Eastern European states in NATO might have implied for the Alliance itself. Because according to the officials at the Pentagon, it “did not make sense to talk about expansion until after NATO had established the type of military-to-military relationships that would enable new countries to integrate effectively into the Alliance”³. In this context, undeniable success that PfP proved explicitly manifested itself in the two new waves of enlargement that NATO undergone in the post-Cold War period. Thus, on 12 March 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland became the first former members of the Warsaw Pact to join NATO. Five years later, on 29 March 2004, in its fifth, and the

largest, round of enlargement ever in the Alliance’s history, seven new countries formally joined NATO: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In this regard, Partnership for Peace proved to be an important stage “in the evolutionary process of the enlargement of NATO”⁴.

§ 1.2 PfP as a stabilizing factor in a new Europe. Already in the London Declaration, adopted at the NAC meeting held in London on July 5-6, 1990, the Allies subscribed to the concept of indivisibility of security in the new Euro-Atlantic security environment created by the end of the Cold war, in a Europe whole and free, recognizing that, “in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbors”⁵. Thus, enhancing stability and improving democracy among and practical cooperation with the countries along NATO’s periphery became crucial for the Allies, who, to get them involved in a new and broader Euro-Atlantic security architecture, expressed through the Declaration the need for the establishment of a closer relationship with Central and Eastern European nations. In this regard, Partnership for Peace proved to

1 Annalisa Monaco, “Ten Years on – Is there still a future for the Partnership after NATO enlargement?”, ISIS Europe NATO Notes, vol. 6 № 1, February 2004.

2 “Study on NATO Enlargement”, September 1995, <www.nato.int>.

3 Goldgeier, James M., “NATO Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision”, Washington Quarterly, vol. 21 № 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 87-88.

4 “Study on NATO Enlargement”, September 1995, <www.nato.int>.

5 “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance”, London, 5-6 July 1990, <www.nato.int>.



be a key element in NATO's political and military cooperation with non-member OSCE countries that were unlikely to join the Alliance in the near future, as a continuing vehicle for active cooperation with NATO; concrete evidence of NATO's continuing support and concern for their security; and their primary link to the Alliance, as a key Euro-Atlantic security institution, including for consultation with NATO in the event an active partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security⁶. In this capacity, keeping non-member CEE and CIS countries involved in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, PfP served, as the former Foreign Minister of Germany Hans-Dietrich Genscher eloquently put it, as a “transatlantic security bridge for the whole of Europe, for the democracies of Western and Eastern Europe”⁷ and in that way it managed to demolish long-lasting barriers between East and West. In this regard, the importance and vitality of PfP as well as other Partnership institutions apparently increase as enlargement further evolves.

§ 1.3 Dealing with Russia. For the Alliance to succeed in its determination to construct a Europe whole and free and avoid new dividing lines in Europe in the new geopolitical setting, it had obviously first and foremost

to properly manage its relationship to Russia. In this context, one of the member countries' major concerns was to prevent the re-imposition of Russian military and/or political control in Eastern and Central Europe and find ways to deal with Russia's potential desire to re-establish itself in CEE states. On the other hand, in their efforts to reach out to the former Soviet satellites, Allies had to be very cautious not to excessively irritate Russia so that not to provoke it to an unpredicted aggressive action. Thus, PfP emerged as a result of the efforts to address two major challenges that NATO had to deal with in the new setting it had found itself after the end of the Cold war:

1. urgent necessity to deal with the new political and security situation in the CEE, and
2. impossibility, due to Russian factor, of suggesting the formal military Alliance structure and formal security guarantees the Alliance possessed to fill the perceived political and security vacuums in the CEE. In this regard, PfP played a crucial role in the Allies' efforts to avoid a new division in Europe and mitigate the negative reaction that the enlargement might have triggered on the Russian side. By having Russia together with all the CEE and CIS states involved through the Partnership in the extended Euro-Atlantic security architec-

ture, the Alliance explicitly and continuously demonstrated “that the enlargement process including the associated military arrangements will threaten no-one and contribute to a developing broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe, enhancing security and stability for all”⁸. The beauty of PfP was in that it managed to have the CEE and CIS states actually integrated in the Euro-Atlantic security structure without NATO being obliged to give them formal security guarantees and, by having Russia also as a PfP partner, leaving Russia no chances to be able to accuse NATO of dragging these countries into the Western camp.

Therefore, in its determined efforts to construct a new, inclusive, and comprehensive security structure in Europe, NATO has sought to continuously strengthen the NATO-Russia relationship further on, in rough parallel with NATO enlargement and dynamically developing partnerships with CEE and CIS states. To that end, in May 1995, NATO and Russia, in addition to signing the NATO-Russia Individual Partnership Program under PfP, also signed the document on the Areas of pursuance of a broad, enhanced NATO/Russia dialogue and cooperation, that envisaged dialogue and cooperation beyond

⁶ “Study on NATO Enlargement”, September 1995, <www.nato.int>.

⁷ Lungu, Sorin, “NATO Cooperation with former adversaries: The Historical Record, 1990 – 1997”, American Diplomacy, Summer 1999 – vol. IV № 3.

⁸ “Study on NATO Enlargement”, September 1995, <www.nato.int>.



the PfP program⁹, such as sharing of information on issues regarding security related matters, political consultations on issues of common concern (proliferation of WMD, nuclear policy, conflicts in Europe) and cooperation in a number of issues including peacekeeping.

In practical, and most important, terms, NATO’s inclusive policy towards Russia in constructing a new, comprehensive Euro-Atlantic security structure materialized in Russian participation in the NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996 that in fact became the first instance in which Russia acknowledged a legitimate role for the Alliance outside its borders¹⁰.

On 27 May 1997, in Paris, just two months before NATO officially extended invitations for membership to the three Eastern European countries, the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security was signed, providing the formal basis for NATO-Russia relations and creating the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) as a forum for regular consultation on security issues of common concern, aimed at helping build mutual confidence through dialogue.

NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Washington

Summit in 1999, specifically states that NATO no longer considers Russia to be a threat or an enemy, but rather a partner¹¹.

NATO-Russia relations were further strengthened in response to the new post-September 11 challenges with signing a joint declaration on “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality” signed in Rome on 28 May 2002, which replaced the PJC with NATO-Russia Council, in which Russia and NATO member states meet as equals “at 27” –instead of in the bilateral “NATO+1” format under the PJC.

Thus, despite the fact that NATO-Russia relations soon evolved beyond the PfP framework, Partnership for Peace was the first and major step in NATO’s efforts to reconcile Russia.

§ 1.4 Implication for neutral countries. PfP had enormous political importance for the European traditional neutral states (Finland, Sweden, Austria, Ireland and Switzerland) that after the end of the Cold war faced the totally changed security environment that suggested both opportunities and dilemmas for them.

On the one hand, the new security environment that emerged in the early 1990s has removed

the Cold war rationale for these countries’ neutral stance. This, along with the fact that four of them are now members of the European Union (except for Switzerland), created risks for them of being increasingly accused of free riding on the defense efforts of others within the Euro-Atlantic security system. Besides, their continuing neutrality in the conditions of increasingly interdependent and interlinked Euro-Atlantic security system created a situation when they had to accept decisions that affect their interests without the opportunity to vote on those decisions.

On the other hand, the populations in these countries still value, yet to a lesser degree, their countries’ neutrality. Thus, a poll in mid-1996 revealed that some 60% of Austrians would vote against NATO membership in a referendum; public opinion polls conducted in October 1996 in Ireland resulted in 69% of the public willing to maintain Ireland’s policy of neutrality¹².

In addition, what makes the issue even more complex is that political elites in these countries represented by political parties are very much divided concerning their countries’ security policies in the new strategic setting.

In this regard, Partnership for Peace Program was more than

⁹ Russia joined PfP on 22 June 1994.

¹⁰ Russia also deployed its forces in Kosovo in June 1999 as part of NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).

¹¹ “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, Washington, 24 April 1999, <www.nato.int>.

¹² Sloan, Stanley R., “NATO Enlargement and the Former European Neutrals”, Library of Congress, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/crs2.htm>.



relevant for them as an option to compromise between the demands that the new security environment suggested and continuance reluctance of the public opinion to abandon the non-aligned posture. Having joined the PfP¹³ these countries got a whole host of opportunities, such as follows:

1. PfP created possibilities for them to design a program of military cooperation with the allies and to contribute to NATO's new missions and in that way to respond to free riding accusations and meet their EU peace support operations requirement without engaging themselves in a military alliance with its mutual defense commitment, and thus maintaining neutrality;
2. Through participation in NACC/EAPC as observers, they got an entree to a NATO debating forum. Thus, although they are still not involved in the decision making process of the Alliance, Partnership created vast possibilities for them to be engaged in “decision-shaping”. PfP has been so far the only dimension in these countries' security policies (aside from EU and CFSP) that enjoys consensus among their political elites.

Thus, in a way, the Partnership represents for these neutrals “a way to make their voice heard without paying the political ‘price’ of full membership”¹⁴.

All comprehensive political inferences that the Partnership for Peace has implied shortly after its inception suggest that it has had overall success, as it managed to put military institutions to serve political goals.

Chapter II. Challenges Ahead and Future Prospects

Having thoroughly analysed the success that highlighted the way the PfP has accomplished its original tasks it had been assigned with in the context of the challenges that the Alliance was faced with in the immediate aftermath of the Cold war, we shall now move to considering the relevance of PfP's “old agenda” to the new challenges that the NATO is faced in the early XXI century, as well as the steps that the Allies should undertake to make the Partnership framework keep serving their interests in the new international setting we are facing today.

§ 2.1 Post-Prague challenges for PfP. After the Prague Summit, PfP was faced with a number of challenges. On the one hand, after Prague, NATO has found itself overburdened with its transformation and operations that implied a risk for the Partnership to recede into the background. On the other hand, in the new geopolitical setting that emerged after Prague, the PfP has found itself having to a major extent fulfilled the tasks it

had been initially assigned with that could very shortly bring about the loss of the mission to follow, as well as the loss of the rationale for existence. And last but not way the least, after its latest enlargement the Alliance found itself having 26 NATO members out of 46 Partners, meaning that the number of members surpassed that of partners. Thus, given the fact that the most active partners already assumed formal membership in the Alliance, NATO's greatest concern was now to seek ways to give a renewed impetus to the Partnership, as it was now considered to be composed of the states whom membership could not be offered to, or the membership was in the remote prospect (e.g. Macedonia, Croatia, Albania, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine), or the partners that were not seeking membership at all – at least in the short run (neutral countries).

Thus, in its search for new mechanisms to intensify the Partnership and address new challenges it was faced with, NATO focused on two parallel processes: deepening and broadening the Partnership. While arrangements aimed at deepening the PfP, build upon broader functional engagement, those directed at broadening the Partnership are to deliver on wider geographic engagement that NATO committed itself to in the aftermath of September 11.

13 Finland was the first to join, followed by Sweden that joined PfP in May 1994, Austria followed in February 1995; Switzerland joined on December 11, 1996. Ireland was that last to join the PfP – in December 1999.

14 Annalisa Monaco, “Ten Years on – Is there still a future for the Partnership after NATO enlargement?”, ISIS Europe NATO Notes, vol. 6 № 1, February 2004.



§2.2 Addressing the challenges: deepening the partnership. If we review NATO’s transformation process throughout 1990s, we can explicitly notice that after each major change that it underwent in terms of membership, or a new mission, the Alliance had this new setting directly reflected in the Partnership framework through offering enhanced partnership structures and deeper differentiation among the Partners. The Study on NATO Enlargement published in September 1995 admitted that “Maintaining the vitality of NACC/PfP may require new approaches and mechanisms to be devised in parallel to the Alliance’s enlargement process”¹⁵. Thus, in parallel with the decision to start accession talks with three countries, taken at the NATO’s July 1997 Summit in Madrid, the Alliance, aiming to prevent the emergence of new “dividing lines” in Europe after the first wave of enlargement, also announced a number of measures to enhance PfP and Partnership framework in general, such as follows:

- a new forum in the shape of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was established to replace NACC, as an overarching framework for all aspects of NATO’s cooperation with its Partners, thus strengthening political consultation element of PfP;
- the operational dimension of

- PfP was strengthened and second PARP cycle introduced to enable Partners to more closely involve themselves in PfP program issues as well as PfP operations;
- Partner staff elements were announced to be established at various levels of the military structure of the Alliance;
- The possibility was created for Partners to establish diplomatic missions to NATO under the Brussels Agreement¹⁶;
- The NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security was signed, and NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council created (PJC);
- The Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine was signed and NATO-Ukraine Commission created to formalize a growing partnership with Ukraine¹⁷.

Following the admission on 12 March 1999 of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into NATO, Partnership for Peace was further strengthened at the NATO’s April 1999 Washington Summit that manifested itself in the following:

- a new Alliance Strategic Concept was approved that for the first time mentioned PfP (para.35) as an Alliance activity;
- Defence Capabilities Initiative was launched to improve interoperability

among Alliance forces and, where applicable, between Alliance and Partner forces;

- Membership Action Plan (MAP) for nine members was approved thus offering a deeper differentiation among the partners;
- Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP operations was approved to enhance Partners’ roles in political guidance and oversight, planning, and command arrangements for such operations;
- A third PARP cycle, expanded and adapted, was endorsed to further enhance the interoperability of Partner forces;
- Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) for NATO-led PfP operations was endorsed to help to engage Partners in future military operations by improving the ability of Partner forces and capabilities to operate with the Alliance in this kind of activities;
- the outline programme on enhancing PfP training and education was endorsed to optimize and harmonize NATO and national PfP activities through introduced three new PfP tools: PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes, a PfP Exercise Simulation Network and PfP Training Centres.

Thus, the above-mentioned facts apparently reveal that in parallel with the NATO’s enlargement

¹⁵ “Study on NATO Enlargement”, September 1995, <www.nato.int>.

¹⁶ Brussels Agreement entered into force on 28 March 1997.

¹⁷ The latter two undertakings suggested first signs of differentiation among the partners.



process, the Alliance sought to offer deeper differentiation among the Partners, in addition to deeper cooperation, in order to keep the Pfp alive, competitive and relevant. This manifested itself in a slight form of differentiation in the form of granting special status to Russia and Ukraine at the Madrid Summit, and it evolved to a deeper extent of differentiation in the form of creating a special framework (MAP) for 9 NATO partners out of 24 (9 MAP and 15 non-MAP countries) at the Washington Summit. Taking into consideration that the remaining twenty partners are far weaker in institutional terms and far more diversified in terms of interests and needs than those already enjoying membership, the necessity of deeper differentiation among them is much greater now than ever before. After Prague Summit, efforts aimed at deepening cooperation with and differentiation among the partners have been streamlined in two dimensions/directions: regional and functional.

2.2.1 Functional dimension. Developing Pfp’s **functional dimension** after the latest enlargement, NATO adopted a number of initiatives aimed at making cooperation with the Partners more targeted and result-oriented. The concerns that the latest and the largest enlargement ever in NATO’s history raised among the Allies were first addressed already at the Prague

Summit, where the Allies endorsed a “Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace”¹⁸ that called for the further development of relations with Partners and for intensified cooperation in responding to new security challenges, including terrorism. The Report introduced the “Partnership Action Plan Mechanism” that represented a pure mechanism of deepening the partnership relations through developing practical and functional cooperation on issues such as border security, civil emergency planning, resource management, and environmental issues.

This newly introduced better targeted, more result-oriented cooperation mechanism first materialized in the form of the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism (PAP-T) adopted by EAPC in November 2002 that committed partners to taking a number of steps to combat terrorism and share the information and experience they possess.

In addition, the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) – a two-year program – with special aim at Central Asia and the Caucasus, was introduced at the Prague Summit, as a kind of an intensified partnership framework designed to help those interested in the reform and modernization of their defense and security structures to move for-

ward. So far, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan joined the IPAP. At the Istanbul Summit, the Allies went further in deepening NATO’s functional engagement with the Partners and launched the Partnership Action Plan for Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB) with the aim at assisting the partners, primarily South Caucasus and Central Asian states, in issues like defense reforms and democratic control of armed forces¹⁹.

2.2.2 Regional dimension. At the same time, developing its **regional dimension**, after the latest enlargement, NATO confined Pfp’s functional dimension to three differentiated distinct regional groups:

1. countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan);
2. the Balkans (Croatia, Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro);
3. neutral countries (Finland, Sweden, Austria, Ireland and Switzerland).

Caucasus and Central Asia. The political and strategic importance of this region greatly increased and explicitly manifested itself after September 11, 2001, when cooperation of the

18 “Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace”, Prague, 21 November 2002.

19 “Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building” (PAP-DIB), Istanbul, 7 June 2004, <www.nato.int>.



regional countries played a crucial role in ousting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Recognizing that, already in the “Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace” adopted at the Prague Summit in November 2002, Allies stressed that they would “support regional cooperation in Central Asia and South Caucasus”²⁰. At the Istanbul Summit NATO went further on in giving the Partnership a political drive, and adopted a strategic vision for Central Asia and the Caucasus in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)/Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP), that was, in fact, designed to serve as a new incentive for those countries to keep on reforming themselves and actively participating in PfP activities. In material terms, it envisaged assignment of two liaison officers to the region. Besides, on 15 September 2004, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced the appointment of Robert F. Simmons Jr. as his Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia. However, within this region one should also differentiate between IPAP countries (Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan) that achieved deeper levels of cooperation with the Allies and went farther in reforming themselves in compliance with NATO standards, and other PfP partners (Armenia, Kazakh-

stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) that are still to catch up with the first mentioned group both in terms of the extent of cooperation and depth of reforms.

Balkan countries.

As far as the Balkan region is concerned, the Allies stressed in Prague, in the “Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace” that they together with Partners “will continue and enhance their efforts to ensure security and stability in the Balkans”²¹. At Istanbul, Allied leaders reaffirmed their commitment to peace and stability in the Balkans. However, in this region, where NATO has recently handed over its missions in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the European Union (operations “Concordia” and “Althea” accordingly), we should also differentiate between:

1. MAP countries (Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia),
2. PfP aspirants (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro) that are not even members of PfP, but who repeatedly expressed their willingness to join the Partnership.

Taking into consideration that NATO is interested in stabilizing this war-torn region that, after the latest enlargement, is

now in the immediate proximity to the Alliance borders, keeping PfP on track is essential for NATO to have the region moving in a “right direction”. In this regard, the prospect of NATO membership for the MAP countries and that for PfP membership for those left aside can become a strong incentive aimed at speeding up reform and transformation processes in the Balkan countries to assist and encourage them on their way towards closer integration with Western Europe.

Neutral countries.

The situation with this group of countries that does not quite well fit NATO’s regional approach towards PfP is slightly different from that with the above-mentioned two groups. The major difference is represented by the fact that these countries that for the time being are not seeking formal NATO membership are at the same time themselves greatly interested in being actively involved in the partnership activities (due to already mentioned reasons) as the only acceptable framework for their engagement in Euro-Atlantic security structures (aside from EU). Their importance for NATO that is interested in keeping them active in the Partnership undertakings is reflected in that they serve as an explicit example of Partnership participation being important per se, not necessarily being a route to

20 “Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace”, Prague, 21 November 2002.

21 Ibid.



membership. The voluntary choice that these countries made for remaining outside the Alliance and the increased and deepened participation in PfP in recent years proved how blurred the difference between some partners and formal members might actually be. Thus, this group of countries does not need any kind of incentive for cooperation, as they themselves are interested in that.

§ 2.3 Addressing the Challenges: broadening the Partnership. Recognizing close linkage between Euro-Atlantic security with the security and stability in the Mediterranean region as well as in the broader Middle Eastern region, NATO has been seeking to adopt a common and cohesive strategy towards the region southwards its borders. So far, these efforts materialized in two initiatives adopted by the Allies in this regard. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. In 1994, at its Brussels Summit, NATO initiated a dialogue with Mediterranean countries aiming at creating good relations and better mutual understanding and confidence throughout the Mediterranean, promoting regional security and stability and correcting misperceptions of NATO's policies and goals.

Mediterranean Dialogue that so far was joined by Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Maurita-

nia, Morocco and Tunisia, has been continuously sought to be strengthened by the Allies. Thus, at the 1997 Madrid Summit, NATO widened the scope of the Mediterranean Dialogue and added a new and more dynamic direction to it by establishing under the authority of the North Atlantic Council the Mediterranean Cooperation Group that created a forum involving Allied member states directly in the political discussions with Dialogue countries.

Intensified practical cooperation and more effective dialogue on security matters of common concern, such as terrorism, have been encouraged since the November 2002 Prague Summit. Measures include a more regular consultation process, a tailored approach to cooperation, and the identification of more focused activities such as improving the ability of Dialogue countries to contribute to NATO-led non-Article 5 operations, defence reform and defence economics, consultation on border security, and disaster management.

The Istanbul Summit further reinforced the Mediterranean Dialogue and invited the Mediterranean Partners “to establish a more ambitious and expanded partnership, guided by the principle of joint ownership and taking into consideration their particular interests and needs”²². Mediterranean Dialogue coun-

tries have also been invited to participate in Operation Active Endeavor.

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). NATO 2004 Istanbul Summit gave birth to a major new initiative for the broader Middle East region called the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative offered first to members of Gulf Cooperation Council, “to foster mutually beneficial bilateral relationships and thus enhance security and stability”²³. According to the Istanbul Summit communiqué, the ICI “focuses on practical cooperation where NATO can add value, notably in the defence and security fields”²⁴. The ICI offers, on a bilateral basis, tailored advice on defence reform, defence budgeting, defence planning and civil-military relations, military-to-military cooperation to contribute to interoperability, fighting terrorism through information sharing and maritime cooperation, countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means and fighting illegal trafficking.

§2.4 Functional approach vs. regional approach. NATO's regional approach to the Partners within the PfP has a number of advantages as well as shortfalls. Among the major disadvantages, we should name the following:

1. the regional approach fails to cover all the Partners that are

²² “Istanbul Summit Communiqué”, Istanbul, 28 June 2004.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.



present in the PfP at the moment, as Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus fail to fit any of above-mentioned distinct groups;

2. considerable and tangible differentiation among the Partners within a certain region itself creates an obstacle for the Alliance to elaborate a cohesive strategy towards the region.

At the same time, among the major advantages of this approach, it is possible to mention the following:

differentiation within the region with regional countries being at different levels of partnership with the Alliance spurs a kind of competition among them creating incentives for those being at less developed stages of cooperation to catch up with the more advanced ones;

1. it is always more efficient and productive to split a certain broader region into some smaller components to be dealt with more easily towards better and sustainable results, rather than dealing with it following a comprehensive strategy.

Meanwhile, the functional approach yet lacking the benefits of the regional perspective, has one major advantage – it allows to develop and deepen cooperation with the partners in strict accordance and parallel with the level of their willingness, potential, and opportunities at a certain period and stage of coopera-

tion, with no regard to the region a certain Partner belongs to. Thus, the main advantage that the functional approach suggests is that it does not confine the cooperation of the Allies with their Partners to the regional boundaries.

Taking into consideration that both approaches have certain advantages that cannot be disregarded, NATO should get deeper into and develop further PfP’s functional dimension, yet keeping and developing further its regional approach as well. In a word, it should make its regional approach more flexible through larger incorporation of the approach of functional cooperation within a certain geopolitical region as well as between and beyond the regions. By doing so, i.e. by partly giving up its regional dimension, NATO could in future bring about the possibility for the most advanced MD and ICI countries to join PfP framework as well. In this sense, Partnership for Peace could serve as an incentive for these countries to move on developing towards democracy and reforming themselves to eventually meet NATO standards. Rigidly speaking, these countries could then join the group of countries that we regarded above in this paper as “PfP aspirants”.

At the same time, NATO’s efforts directed towards widening its geographic engagement beyond the PfP, in its southern borders, are in a way a continuation

of the Allies’ regional approach towards the Partnership for Peace. Efforts exerted by the Allies to deepen and enhance cooperation with the southern neighbors tend to make the difference between the PfP and other non-PfP regional initiatives increasingly blurred. In this regard, due to growing interconnectivity and closing of NATO’s initiatives aimed at deepening and broadening the Partnership, it would be more efficient to assume a more flexible approach and merge the two processes by introducing a close link between the PfP and other non-PfP regional initiatives such as Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The prospects for these countries to join the PfP some day once they meet a specific set of requirements can become a sort of this geopolitically required link.

Once the Allies give up geographical dimension, or to speak more precisely, geographical restrictions, imposed so far upon the PfP, they will pave the way to a completely new role that PfP has a potential to assume in the longer perspective. Having been regarded so far as a kind of a bridge between NATO and non-NATO East European and CIS states to serve as a framework for cooperation between them, it can assume this role with regards to the states beyond the mentioned region. In practical terms, that would imply the possibilities for PfP to expand even beyond the broader Middle



East region to possibly include some day in the future such states like Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and other states in Latin America, Asia, Oceania, that seek closer cooperation with NATO, both in military and in political fields, but that due to geographical restrictions cannot become a formal member of the Alliance. On-going cooperation between the Allies and non-allied members of PfP can serve as an explicit example for how this framework can very well serve the interests of both sides. Once this important step is made that will considerably change PfP’s rationale for existence, it will guarantee itself from marginalization that otherwise is unavoidable, after one day Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, and probably Azerbaijan and Georgia that are at present the most active PfP members (along with the non-Allied partners) join the Alliance.

§ 2.5 Short-term vs. long-term perspective. Bearing in mind the above-mentioned considerations, it is possible to view the future prospects that PfP might be faced with in the short term as well as in the long-term perspective.

Thus, the time frame for the short-term perspective is defined here to cover the period until PfP reaches its bifurcation point to be highlighted by the foreseen admission into NATO of the Alliance’s current MAP countries (Albania, Macedonia,

and Croatia), IPAP partners (Azerbaijan and Georgia), and Ukraine. This period will not imply radical structural changes for the PfP that will still have members that are:

1. committed to NATO membership that will drive further on their reforms process, and
2. advanced enough to achieve NATO membership in the foreseeable future.

Therefore, PfP during this period can survive “by inertia”, living up the period of its linear evolution and focusing on functional engagement with these advanced partners as well as with other, less advanced, PfP members in the defined regions. However during this period PfP should concentrate on and diversify the functional dimension to strengthen PfP’s operational role.

After the mentioned wave (-s) of enlargement the numbers of the Partners left within the PfP will be so few and their institutional development so low that the Alliance will have to consider radical changes in the PfP rationale to keep it relevant in the totally new geopolitical setting to emerge. At the same time, the Partnership for Peace will still have enormous unused potential to be streamlined in other directions. Therefore, given that NATO applies the above-mentioned recommendations in tackling its relations with the Partners, and considering that

some of today’s most advanced partners join the Alliance, the PfP can in the longer run reform its rationale to assume the following shape.

1. PfP will mainly lose its role as a bridge towards NATO membership and will rather focus on the second role assigned to it in the Study on NATO Enlargement, i.e. on strengthening relations with partner countries that may be unlikely to join the Alliance early or at all²⁵.
2. In this capacity PfP will continue to serve as a stabilizing and democratizing factor, but its regional framework shall expand in this regard to incorporate the following regions:

Old responsibilities:

2. The CIS countries (Central Asian states, Armenia, Moldova, Belarus) –
 - a. though the region is placed here among PfP’s old responsibilities, the importance of PfP as a stabilizing factor has greatly increased in this part of the world after NATO’s latest enlargement that brought the regional countries to the immediate proximity of the Alliance; the vitality of PfP will evolve even further after the next wave (waves) of enlargement envisaged in the given paper;
 - b. Russia;
 - c. the Balkan region (today’s

²⁵ “Study on NATO Enlargement”, September 1995, <www.nato.int>.



PfP aspirants – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro);

New responsibility to be assumed:

d. the Broader Middle East and Mediterranean countries.

3. PfP will continue to prove its relevance in the Alliance’s efforts to reconcile Russia, but the regional focus in this regard shall also expand beyond the CIS countries to the Broader Middle East region. Thus, while reconciling Russia as far as the Allies’ efforts to stabilize and democratize non-member CIS states will still retain its great importance, the major “competition” is soon to be shifted to the Broader Middle East region. As Russia now seems to embark on activities aimed at regaining its once lost positions in the Middle East, PfP can in the long-term perspective become a very good platform for and efficient framework in the Allies’ efforts to promote democratic values over the Broader Middle East without risking recreating the dividing lines reminiscent of the Col war period. Rigidly speaking, PfP has a great potential to assume in this regard the role it successfully played and still plays in the CEE and CIS countries.

4. The framework established for the neutral states can serve as a very good example for shaping NATO’s relations with the states willing to establish forms of cooperation with NATO, but that due to geo-

graphical restrictions cannot become a formal member of the Alliance (New Zealand, Australia, Israel, Argentina, etc). In this regard, PfP has a vast potential to become a prime instrument for developing the military and civil interoperability for those countries to enable them to contribute to NATO-led crisis management and peace support operations. Assuming this role and taking on this new rationale, PfP will transform to a major tool for NATO to fulfill its perceived goal to “go global” without the necessity of re-considering Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.

Thus, having followed the considerations that the given paper has suggested, we may conclude that despite frequently and strongly expressed fears that after NATO’s latest 2004 enlargement, PfP may become irrelevant, it still retains its vitality for the Alliance that does or should manifest itself with regards to at least two major issues. First of all, the latest enlargement logically expanded NATO’s geographical area of responsibility, thus bringing the remaining PfP Partners to the immediate proximity of the Alliance. In this regard, taking into consideration the concept of “indivisibility of security” that the Alliance committed itself to, the new geopolitical setting that emerged in the aftermath of NATO’s fifth wave of enlargement enormously increased the importance the Allies attached to insuring security and stability in these already neighbor coun-

tries. In this new context, the importance of the Partnership for Peace as a stabilization and democratization factor apparently increases with regards to these countries, namely those in **the South Caucasus and Central Asia**, as well as **Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine**.

Besides, during the first decade of its post-Cold war existence, the Alliance had efficiently used the PfP framework to tackle the challenges and accomplish the goals that the geopolitical situation in the early 1990-s required. In this regard, having successfully accomplished the “old” tasks initially assigned to it, the PfP has the potential to assume a new important role and adjust itself to address the **new challenges** that the Alliance is faced with in the early XXI century’s international security setting. In this context, the Partnership framework can and should play a central role in assisting NATO to address the following challenges it is faced today and fulfill the following tasks it assigned for itself:

- **Fighting international terrorism.** Taking into consideration the asymmetric nature of the phenomenon of terrorism that has no borders, the Partnership for Peace framework is essential for the Alliance to be able to effectively cope with this new security challenge of the XXI century that has already moved to the list of NATO’s top priorities. The PAP-T launched at the Prague Summit is paramount in



this respect and it should be further developed towards strengthening its operational role and mechanisms.

- **Democratization and stabilization in the region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa.** In this regard, in the longer-term perspective PfP can and should play in this region a role it has successfully fulfilled in the CEE states and still carries out in CIS countries and in the Balkans.

- **New Partnerships with non-European countries.** PfP can and should assume a central role in institutionalizing relations with non-European countries that seek closer military cooperation with NATO but do not quite fit the Alliance’s regional “label”. That would broaden the

Euro-Atlantic coalition, the biggest in the world, even further thus granting the PfP a central role in materializing NATO’s perceived ambitions to “go global” without the necessity of re-considering the Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.

It is also worth noting that with regards to the first mentioned issue – stabilization and democratization of the CIS countries – PfP will keep its relevance in the **short-term period**. Should some of the CIS countries, such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine, one day join the Alliance, PfP will be inevitably marginalized unless it assumes responsibility with regards to the second set of the above-mentioned challenges that are to retain their importance in a much **longer time frame**.

In this regard, it is important to mention that for the Partnership for Peace to keep its long-term relevance it should adjust itself to the Alliance’s new security challenges by assuming a new rationale for its existence. For the PfP to succeed in that, it is absolutely essential for it to:

- gradually give up geographical limitations it has initially imposed upon itself, and commit itself to a wider geographic engagement, and
- prioritize the functional engagement with its old and new Partners.

In this context, the PfP is faced today with the very challenge that the Alliance itself was faced a decade ago: rigidly speaking, PfP should go **“out of area” or “out of business”**.



BASIC DOCUMENTS

Partnership for Peace: Framework Document issued by the Head of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council

Brussels, 10 January 1994

1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10/11 January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.
2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.

They reaffirm their commitment to fulfill in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfillment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.

3. The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in pursuing the following objectives:
 - a. facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
 - b. ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
 - c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
 - d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; e. the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.
4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities.



NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership’s objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.

5. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership Programmes.
6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:
 - a. those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;
 - b. they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;
 - c. they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;
 - d. those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;
 - e. building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces;
 - f. they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/ Partnership for Peace.
7. In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:
 - a. develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;
 - b. promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine.
8. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.



Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace

BACKGROUND

1. In accordance with NATO’s Strategic Concept, through outreach and openness, the Alliance seeks to preserve peace, support and promote democracy, contribute to prosperity and progress, and foster genuine Partnership with and among all democratic Euro-Atlantic countries. This aims at enhancing the security of all, excludes nobody, and helps to overcome divisions and disagreements that could lead to instability and conflict. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council is the overarching framework for all aspects of NATO’s cooperation with its Partners. Partnership for Peace is the principal mechanism for forging practical security links between the Alliance and its Partners and for enhancing interoperability between Partners and NATO.
2. NATO Ministers in their meetings in Reykjavik and Brussels in May/June 2002 stated that they looked forward to a new, more substantive relationship with Partners, which intensifies cooperation in responding to new security challenges, including terrorism. Ministers tasked the Council in Permanent Session to continue reviewing NATO’s Partnerships, with a view to presenting the Heads of State and Government at Prague with concrete proposals for further developing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) to better serve Allies and Partners in addressing the challenges of the 21st century.
3. In undertaking this review, Allies and Partners have recognized the continuing validity of the PfP Framework Document and the EAPC Basic Document. They have reconfirmed their joint commitment to strengthen and extend peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, on the basis of the shared values and principles which underlie their cooperation. They have reaffirmed their commitment to Euro-Atlantic Partnership and their determination to further build on the success of EAPC and PfP across all areas of consultation and cooperation. Allies and Partners remain committed to relevant decisions of the Madrid and Washington Summits and will continue efforts to fully implement them. In this context, they stress the continued crucial role of interoperability of Allied and Partner forces as prerequisite of further successful cooperation in responding to crises.
4. Building on the distinctive roles of the EAPC and PfP the particular aim of the review was to ensure that the EAPC and PfP:
 - contribute to international stability by providing interested Partners with systematic advice on, and assistance in, the defence and security - related aspects of their domestic reform process; where possible support larger policy and institutional reforms;
 - help create favorable external conditions for domestic reform by appropriate forms of political dialogue and cooperation;
 - contribute to international security by preparing interested Partners for, and engaging in, NATO-led operations and activities, including those related to the response to terrorism;
 - continue to support, for interested Partners, NATO’s open door policy as reflected in the 1994 PfP Invitation document.
5. To reach this aim, the review was conducted with a view to:
 - addressing effectively the diversity of Allies’ interests and Partners’ needs;



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- adapting forms of consultation and cooperation to ensure that they respond to the new security challenges;
- further enhancing interoperability between Partner forces and those of the Alliance;
- rationalizing and harmonizing the relationship between EAPC and PfP;
- improving the management and organisation of the EAPC and PfP process.

PROPOSED INNOVATIONS AND ADAPTATIONS

5.1 Enhancing Political and Security-Related Consultations

- Allies and Partners will strive to ensure that EAPC discussions focus to a greater degree on shared NATO and Partner political priorities and key security concerns. Allies will make efforts to inform Partners and/or seek their views at early stages of Alliance discussions on issues of importance to Partners’ political and security interests.
- Allies will welcome requests by Partners for political consultations with the Alliance, individually or in smaller groups, on issues of particular political and security importance to them. Relevant decisions will be made on a case-by-case basis. Such consultations could be held at different levels, with Nations and/or the International Staff. They may but do not have to lead to more systematic political relationships.
- On a case-by-case basis and when appropriate, Allies may decide to invite individual Partners to participate in their deliberations on issues of particular relevance to those Partners, or on such issues where Partners’ views would be of particular significance to Allies.

5.2 Further Enhancing Interoperability

- Since PfP’s inception in 1994 interoperability has been a core element in NATO’s cooperation with Partners. The PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP), which was introduced in 1994 and considerably strengthened in 1997, is one of the most important vehicles for development of interoperability. PARP has made it possible to launch the NATO-led PfP operations in the Balkans, which has benefited from the substantial contributions from Partners. At the same time PARP has become a useful planning tool for participating Partners, having developed into a planning process very similar to NATO’s defence planning process. With the Washington Summit’s initiatives, PfP’s operational role has been further enhanced.

Allies and Partners :

- stress that the proven tools provided by the Washington Summit initiatives for the enhanced and more operational Partnership, in conjunction with PARP and exercises, including the most demanding ones, are crucial for further enhancing interoperability;
- agree that determined further efforts are necessary to ensure the full implementation of, and where needed increased scope for, these tools, in particular for the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) and the Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP);
- will continue to consider developments related to interoperability in PfP in the evolution and possible adaptation of PARP.

5.3 Reflecting Broader Approach to Security in EAPC and PfP

- In consultation with Partners, Allies will:
 - review and if necessary expand the scope and contents of the PWP in order to appropriately address the



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new risks and challenges.

- consider possible new measures to facilitate and harmonize operational cooperation between security structures including those beyond the responsibilities of respective MODs, according to requests by national authorities;
 - Further develop cooperation in civil emergency planning, in order to support national authorities to prepare for the protection of the civilian population from WMD incidents, terrorist attacks, technological accidents and natural disasters. This may also include work on ways to promote interoperability between relevant national capabilities.
- Allies and Partners will:
- reflect the broader approach to security in their political consultations and other discussions in the appropriate EAPC and PfP frameworks;
 - seek complementarity of their efforts in response to new security challenges, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism, with those of other international organisations.

5.4 A More Cohesive and Result-Oriented Partnership: the Partnership Action Plan Mechanism

- To enhance and focus their joint efforts in support of Euro-Atlantic security, Allies and Partners will develop and implement an issue-specific, result-oriented mechanism for practical cooperation involving Allies and interested Partners. Possible areas to which such approach could be applied include border security, capabilities for joint action, civil emergency, management of resources or environmental issues. Such a mechanism could also be applied to address pragmatically specific problems in regional context.
- Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism will be a first effort of this kind. It will systematize and organize all forms of Partners’ interaction with NATO in the response to terrorism.

5.5 More Individualized and Comprehensive Relations with Partners: The Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP)

- Allies are determined to continue and enhance support for, and advice to, interested Partners, in their efforts to reform and modernize their defence and security systems to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The Alliance stands ready to support larger policy and institutional reforms undertaken by Partners.
- In this context, Allies encourage Partners to seek closer relations with NATO individually and agree on Individual Partnership Action Plans which will prioritize, harmonize, and organize all aspects of NATO-Partner relationship in the EAPC and PfP frameworks, in accordance with NATO’s objectives and each interested Partner’s particular circumstances and interests.
- Through such plans, developed on a two-year basis, NATO will provide its focused, country-specific assistance and advice on reform objectives that interested Partners might wish to pursue in consultation with the Alliance. Intensified political dialogue on relevant issues may constitute an integral part of an IPAP process.
- IPAP would not replace the IPP nor affect a Partner’s participation in PARP. The IPP and its related database, modified as necessary, could be a subset of IPAP and continue to serve as a key instrument in organizing Partner’s participation in PfP. For nations not opting for an IPAP, the process for the IPP would remain unchanged.

5.6 Increasing the Contribution of Partnership to Security and Stability at Sub-Regional Level

- Allies and Partners will continue and enhance their efforts to ensure security and stability in the Balkans. They will promote and support regional cooperation, building on the experience of NATO’s South-Eastern Europe Initiative (SEEI), SEEGROUP, and other regional efforts.



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- Allies, in consultation and cooperation with interested Partners, and taking account of experience developed in South-Eastern Europe, will support regional cooperation in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
- For this purpose, they will be ready to designate experts or NATO facilitator(s) to help identify areas of common interest and support practical cooperation endeavours.
- Allies and Partners will seek application of the Partnership Action Plan mechanisms to address regional problems.
- Allies will encourage, in line with the overall aim of promoting interoperability in preparation for specific operations, the establishment of multinational formations between Partners, and between Partners and Allies, and the further development of existing arrangements in this regard.
- Allies will consider how NATO military headquarters at all relevant levels, could best support regional cooperation efforts in the Euro-Atlantic area.

5.7 Increasing the Association of Partners with NATO Decision Making Process in Specific Areas

- Allies, in consultation with Partners, will continue efforts to ensure, and to the maximum extent possible increase, involvement of Partners, as appropriate, in the planning, conduct and oversight of those activities and projects which they participate in and contribute to.
- To this end, they will:
- Within the scope of the PMF,
 - consider, in general, the scope for further improvements in practicing to the full the PMF provisions to involve contributing Partners as early as possible in the preparation of decisions relating to NATO-led operations in which they participate.
 - explore, in this context, possibilities for an appropriate involvement of Partners in assessments of relevant aspects of the terrorist threat.
- In addition, examine where it would be appropriate to apply underlying principles and the spirit of the Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Operations (PMF) to other specific Partnership-related activities and projects in which they participate or to which they contribute. Areas for consideration could include: PfP exercises, including PfP aspects of NATO/PfP exercise policy and programming as well as exercise development; and implementation of PfP Trust Funds.
- Also examine how the involvement of participating Partners could, where appropriate, be enabled or further enhanced in the following areas, by pragmatic arrangements building on existing procedures:
 - in the development and implementation of Partnership Action Plans, such as for enhancing specific capabilities critical for defence against terrorist attacks;
 - In developing and agreeing Individual Partnership Action Plans ;
 - in the broader context of interoperability in PfP, PARP, and related work in the field of standardization, including relevant aspects of NBC defence issues;
 - in Civil Emergency Planning (CEP).

5.8. Improving Liaison Arrangements between NATO and Partner Capitals

- Allies will consider ways to improve liaison arrangements between NATO and Partner capitals in order to make NATO expertise and guidance better available to countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and with the aim of better supporting development and implementation of cooperation and information activities and programmes under EAPC and PfP.



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5.9. Promoting Closer Routine Working Relationships between Military Structures as well as between Civil/Military Structures

- NATO and/or Allies will seek more formalized functional working relationships/liaison arrangements with Partners, for military units and headquarters, drawing on provisions already foreseen in the framework of the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC). These could include:
 - "Twinning" of Allied and Partner units and also between units of Partner countries, that are likely to co-operate in NATO-led crisis response operations; in particular arrangements for close cooperation and liaison should be established between forces specialized for employment in asymmetric environments;
 - Promoting, further enhancing and formalizing working relationships already developed over time during exercises or operations between all levels of NATO Commands and Allied multi-national force headquarters with Partner forces and headquarters (“affiliation”), including attachment of Partner personnel to appropriate multi-national headquarters of the NATO Force Structure;
 - Based on existing liaison arrangements at the level of NATO Strategic Commands, expanding the scope of temporary assignments of Partner liaison personnel at subordinate levels of the NATO Command Structure to a more formalized approach, based on practical cooperation requirements.
- Allies, in consultation with Partners, will review existing PfP concepts and structures (including for the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC), PfP Staff Elements (PSE) and PfP Training Centres) with the aim of making use of their full potential to involve Partners more closely, more directly and on a more regular basis in PfP related activities with NATO and Allied nations. This should include consideration of improving existing mechanisms for stocktaking, analysis and dissemination of lessons learned from NATO/PfP exercises.
- Allies and Partners will promote the establishment of routine working relationship, similar to those between military structures, also between relevant civil/military structures.

5.10 Offering Increased Opportunities for Civilian Partner Personnel in NATO Structures

- Allies will:
 - review the PfP Internship Programme with the aim of extending the scope for intern positions in other areas of the NATO/PfP work, increasing the number of slots offered and extending the internship time as appropriate;
 - examine the utility, feasibility, and potential consequences of a concept of civilian “Integrated PfP Staffs.”

5.11 Improving Funding Arrangements

- Allies will examine the PfP Funding Policy with a view to increasing flexibility in responding to Partners’ individual requests for subsidies, allowing for adequate funding for participation in Partnership activities and ensuring coherence between Partners’ funding requests and their Partnership objectives.
- The PfP Trust Fund policy has been revised to extend the mechanism to assist Partners in managing the consequences of defence reform. This may include, but is not limited to, projects promoting civil and democratic reform of the armed forces, retraining of military personnel, base conversion, and promoting effective defence planning and budgeting under democratic control. All initiatives will be run on a project basis.
- Allies will review the NATO policy on NSIP funding for PfP projects with a view to its fuller application, including to projects related to response to terrorism.



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5.12 Improving the Organisation and Management of Partnership Work

- A notion of a “Euro-Atlantic Partnership”, encompassing both EAPC and PfP, highlights the coherent nature of NATO’s relationship with its Partners. Such a comprehensive approach will help to improve the procedures to steer and guide Partnership work efficiently and in a coherent way across the full spectrum of areas of cooperation under the EAPC and PfP frameworks.
- Allies will examine ways to harmonize and enhance NATO committee support for EAPC and PfP with a view to providing continuous and coherent political guidance on NATO’s objectives and policies for the Euro-Atlantic Partnership.
- Allies and Partners will enhance the role of the PMSC Clearing House in the context of bilateral assistance and the coordination of efforts on key PfP issues; and promote exchange of information with other International Organisations, in particular EU and OSCE, and with NGOs, on relevant concepts/programmes, to seek synergy in providing assistance. In this context, the idea of “mentoring Partnerships” (involving at least one NATO member and one Partner) as already practiced for PfP Trust Funds will be further developed, with the aim of providing lead roles for Partner nations in specific functional or thematic areas.
- Allies and Partners will consider how to further improve the structure, organisation and conduct of EAPC meetings at all levels, and to adapt other aspects of the EAPC and PfP processes to ensure most efficient, coherent and coordinated support for the new, more substantive relationship between NATO and its Partners.

RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

6. To ensure credibility of NATO commitments, efficiency of efforts, and the consistency of these efforts with NATO political priorities, continuous, careful and full consideration will be given to financial and human resource implications of any of the proposed changes to EAPC/PfP policies, activities and forms of cooperation, at every stage of their development and implementation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. Heads of State and Governments are invited
 - to endorse this report;
 - to task the Council in Permanent Session to provide further guidance to the appropriate NATO committees as necessary to ensure that the proposals for the adaptation of the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace be further developed and implemented, and
 - to task the Council in Permanent Session to keep Foreign and Defence Ministers informed of progress and to provide a full report on the implementation of the Prague Summit decisions at their Autumn 2003 meetings.



The Euro-Atlantic Partnership - Refocusing and Renewal

I. ADAPTING OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES OF PARTNERSHIP

1. The New International Environment 1.1. NATO's policy of Partnership and Cooperation and the PfP have lasted for more than 10 years, and during that period the international environment has changed. Democratic transformation in Central and most of South-Eastern Europe has succeeded. NATO and the EU are enlarging. The grounds have been laid for further efforts to secure and stabilize the Balkans and to pursue integration of countries in this region into the Euro-Atlantic structures, including the participation of Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina in EAPC/PfP when all the conditions are met. Partners have joined, and contributed greatly to, NATO-led efforts to ensure security in Europe and beyond. NATO's relations with Russia have been put on new and solid foundations. Ukraine is making a growing contribution to stability and security in Europe.

1.2. At the same time, the challenges to Euro-Atlantic security are changing. The evolving threats, including terrorism, have domestic and external sources and a transnational nature. While threats to stability remain in the strategically important region of the Balkans and particularly in Kosovo, events in Afghanistan, where NATO leads the ISAF operation, have demonstrated that threats to our common security increasingly come from the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic area. In this environment, international stability and security will increasingly depend on domestic reform on the one hand, and wide international co-operation on the other. These two imperatives are inseparable, for effective security co-operation is impossible absent basic doctrines and institutions of a fundamentally democratic nature.

1.3. The Allies are determined that the Euro-Atlantic Partnership play an enhanced role in both respects, taking into account the role of international organisations and regional organisations and cooperation in these areas. They will develop it accordingly, in close co-operation with Partners, building upon the founding documents of PfP and EAPC and the decisions of the Washington and Prague Summits. In doing so, Allies will take account of NATO's continued commitment to Eastern and South East Europe, of the need to bring more stability and security to the Caucasus and Central Asia, and of the valuable contribution that the Western European Partners make to NATO-led operations and Partnership programmes.

2. The Objectives of NATO's Partnership Policy

2.1. Dialogue and Co-operation: NATO will conduct political dialogue and practical co-operation with its Partners on a broad range of international and appropriate domestic issues of common concern, in particular those related to terrorism and other evolving threats to security. NATO will be prepared to develop such dialogue and co-operation in different formats, on a geographical or functional basis, and in agreement with EAPC and PfP principles. The Alliance will encourage and support regional initiatives to address such issues.

2.2. Reform: NATO will enhance its efforts to promote democratic values and foster democratic transformation across the Euro-Atlantic area. To this end, the Alliance will provide interested Partners with political and practical advice on, and assistance in, the defence and security-related aspects of the domestic reform, including armed forces under civilian and democratic control. NATO will also encourage larger pol-



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icy and institutional reform and support it within its competence and resources, complementing efforts by other international organisations.

2.3. Operations: NATO will continue to prepare interested Partners for participation in NATO-led operations. For this purpose, it will cooperate with all Partners, giving greater attention to their individual abilities and interests, in order to support their efforts to develop military interoperability and transform their defence in keeping with NATO's own evolving operational role and capabilities.

2.4. Enlargement: NATO will continue through Partnership for Peace to support Partners who wish to join the Alliance, consistent with the Open Door policy enshrined in the Washington Treaty and the PfP Invitation Document.

3. Current Priorities

3.1. Geographic Priority – Special Focus on the regions of Caucasus and Central Asia

3.1.1. NATO will continue to engage, and promote democratic transformation in, and regional co-operation between, Partner countries in Eastern and South-East Europe, including the Republic of Moldova. However, in response to the changing international environment, the Alliance will put special focus on engaging with Partners in the strategically important regions of Caucasus and Central Asia. As a result of the accession of seven former Partners to NATO, where possible and appropriate, NATO will refocus existing resources toward these two regions, consistent with NATO's long term strategy to enhance stability across the Euro-Atlantic area by encouraging and supporting reform.

3.1.2. NATO will give priority to these countries in implementing the existing and new co-operation programmes, in particular IPAP, PAP-DIB, PARP and PAP-T. NATO will pay special attention to the individual needs of those Partners who have demonstrated the willingness and commitment to participate in these programmes, will provide enhanced training and education, and will strive to help them manage the consequences of defence reform, including through the PfP trust fund mechanism. IPAP in particular could lead to a qualitatively enhanced political dialogue focused on creating the domestic and external environment specific to each country conducive to domestic reform, assessing Partners' reform progress, and facilitating more targeted Allied assistance.

3.1.3. To improve communication and support work with Partners in the Caucasus and Central Asia, NATO will:

- consider ways to enhance committee and staff support for Partnership activities within existing structures and resources, including through visits from and to these Partners;
- enhance the role of NATO Contact Point Embassies (CPEs), including by expanding their mandate;
- expand the scope of national, committee and staff support to the CPEs;
- intensify work with the Missions to NATO from these countries;
- encourage exchange of information and co-operation with and between national Allied defence or military advisors working as experts in these countries; and
- nominate Secretary General's Special Representative for the Caucasus and for Central Asia from among existing International Staff.

3.1.4. In addition to these steps, Allies will give positive consideration to the requests of Partner countries for enhanced local NATO representation provided that they:

- demonstrate active commitment to principles and goals expressed in PfP and EAPC basic documents, and their readiness to engage in relevant reforms, in particular through the IPAP,



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- demonstrate their determination to undertake defence reform along democratic lines as defined in particular in the PAP-DIB,
- manifest the will for substantial practical co-operation with NATO, including in support of NATO operations, and;
- offer to provide resources to host NATO representation in their defence institutions or other office premises.

3.1.4.1. To respond in a balanced way to such requests, and to assist and provide advice to these Partners in implementing co-operation programmes and activities focused on PARP, and relevant aspects of IPAP, PAP-DIB and PAP-T, the North Atlantic Council has decided to appoint one NATO Officer for the Caucasus and one NATO Officer for Central Asia, to be embedded preferably within the appropriate institutions dealing with defence and PfP issues of the host nation. The terms of reference of those officers will be consistent with the General Guidelines on NATO Offices in Non-NATO Countries and their mandate will be reviewed in light of the criteria set out above.

3.2. Substantive Priorities - Meeting the Challenges of Today

3.2.1. Reform – Laying the Foundations for Modern Defence Systems: Pursuing a broad agenda of democratic transformation, NATO will give priority to helping Partner Nations, in particular those in the Caucasus and Central Asia, to develop modern and democratically responsible defence institutions, which will be able to support international security co-operation.

3.2.2. Operations – Enhancing Partner Contributions: Continuing to develop general Partner capabilities important to, and interoperable with, the Alliance, NATO will particularly promote the development of Partner capabilities that provide a unique or high-value contribution, including through a challenging exercise programme.

3.2.3. Dialogue and Co-operation – Fighting against Terrorism: In all co-operative efforts, NATO will pay particular attention to dialogue, exchange of expertise and developing mechanisms and instruments for enabling Partner contributions to the Alliance's response to terrorism and protection of civilian populations against Weapons of Mass Destruction.

II. MATCHING THE ENDS AND MEANS - NEW CO-OPERATION INITIATIVES

4. To ensure substantive progress towards Partnership objectives and priorities, NATO will continue pursuing vigorously the Partnership initiatives undertaken at the Washington and Prague Summits and will encourage Partners to make the full use of all instruments offered in the Comprehensive Review of EAPC and PfP. NATO will also take further steps to develop and complement these initiatives. While taking these steps, NATO expects all Partners to fulfil their commitments to the protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms, human rights and other fundamental values embedded in the basic documents of PfP and EAPC. For its part, NATO will enhance its efforts to encourage and assist Partners to implement these values through the new co-operation initiatives.

4.1. Reform

4.1.1. NATO will support vigorously the implementation of the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB). This Plan offers Allies and all Partners a common political and conceptual platform for bilateral and multilateral co-operation in developing efficient and democratically responsible defence institutions. PAP-DIB will help define objectives and priorities of work in this area, foster resource efficiency, and encourage exchange of experience among all Allies and Partners. IPAP and PARP will serve as primary instruments for pursuing commonly recognized reform objectives formulated in PAP-DIB. Multilateral activities, including in regional context, will complement this work. Possible mea-



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asures to facilitate and harmonize operational co-operation between Partner security structures will also be considered.

4.1.2. NATO will also enhance support to those Nations engaged in IPAP, including by programming of education and training in defence management and defence reform. Such programming will seek to tap the expertise of Partners and new Allies, which have successfully undertaken defence reform. NATO will also launch a series of workshops on defence and security economics with Partners participating in IPAP.

4.2. Operations

4.2.1. NATO welcomes continued Partner participation in NATO-led non-Art.5 operations. The Alliance will seek the earliest possible involvement by troop contributing nations in the decision-shaping process. Building on the ISAF experience, NATO could offer political consultations, including in NAC plus format, as a regular feature of non-NATO troop contributing Partners' association with NATO decision-making on operations in which they participate. To further facilitate NNCN's national planning regarding their contributions to NATO-led non-Art.5 operations, NATO will ensure appropriate access to the relevant documentation in accordance with agreed procedures. In the same vein, in addition to the well established interaction with contributing Partners in the Policy Coordination Group (PCG) and MC Working Group on Operations, meetings with non-NATO troop contributors could take place in other appropriate MC Working Groups or, when appropriate, in the Military Committee, as foreseen in the PMF.

4.2.2. NATO will continue to further develop and give more substance to the Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP) and the Military Training and Exercise Programme (MTEP), including exercise activities in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This will support NATO's growing role, increasingly complex operational requirements and Partners' increased participation in operations. This effort will include in particular ADL/simulation and PfP Training Centres and will strengthen co-operation in the framework of the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies, in particular with regard to the Education and Training Track. It could also include exercises to prepare military contributions for civil-military operations, including in support for border security activities, and logistics support in and through Partner states. NATO will encourage the creation of PfP training centres, including those focused on the Caucasus and Central Asia.*

4.2.3. NATO has formulated modalities for encouraging participation of Partners in the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) multinational projects. Allies will apply this pragmatic approach in other areas of defence transformation including with regard to the NATO Response Force (NRF). While any eventual Partner contributions to the NRF should be supplementary to the requirements established for the force, both the training and exercise programme of the NRF and the PfP training and exercise programmes should provide opportunities for interaction, without diminishing NRF readiness, and more generally promote interoperability between the NRF and Partner forces. Partner contributions could allow for enhanced operational flexibility. In this respect, existing PfP mechanisms, such as the PARP and OCC, need to be exploited to promote the development of appropriate Partner contributions. Transparency will be sought in relations with Partners with regard to criteria for rapid response units, to facilitate the development of their own rapid response forces. In the same context, as part of the implementation of the Operational Capabilities Concept, interoperability standards and related assessments will be harmonized with respective NATO mechanisms.

4.2.4. NATO will use the implementation of the new command structure to increase the value of participation by Partners, including by considering new responsibilities and authorities and by better integrating them in non-article 5 planning as feasible. In addition, Partners will be offered appropriate representation in the Allied Command Transformation at its HQ in Norfolk. The modalities for the PfP Staff Elements will be reviewed, as appropriate and in accordance with NATO Security Policy; including consideration of the



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establishment of PfP Staff Elements in ACT's subordinate structures, such as the Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger.

4.2.5. Building upon extensive co-operation on protection of civil populations against WMD, opportunities will be offered to Partners for contributing to military co-operation in this field, including on protection of troops and, as appropriate, the CBRN battalion.

4.2.6. NATO will engage Partners more extensively in defence equipment-related activities in the framework of the CNAD. In particular, Partners will be associated to the greatest possible extent with equipment-related effort to address the Prague Capabilities Commitment and the defence against terrorism.

4.3. Dialogue and Co-operation

4.3.1. The new EAPC Security Forum will enhance high-level political dialogue among Allies and Partners on key security issues of common concern and will open this dialogue to the public and the civil society in Allied and Partner countries.

4.3.2. The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) remains the main platform for joint efforts by Allies and Partners in the fight against terrorism. It will be further implemented and developed with a view to enhancing practical co-operation, extending participation, improving co-operation with other international organisations, and developing supporting mechanisms. In particular, co-operation activities will be undertaken, developed, or further considered in a number of areas, including operations and exercises, training, border security and management, exchange of information, consequence management, and small arms and light weapons and man-portable air-defence systems.

4.3.3. EAPC/PfP Partners, along with Mediterranean Partners and selected triple-non countries, will be invited, in accordance with agreed procedures, taking into account their willingness and capability, and based on operational criteria, to cooperate in Operation Active Endeavour, including through active participation.

4.3.4. In view of the terrorist threat, NATO will enhance co-operation with interested Partners on relevant aspects of Air Defence and Air Traffic Management. This will include exchange of information on civil-military air traffic procedures. Particular stress will be put on involving interested Partners on a case-by-case basis in Air Situation Data exchange.

4.3.5. The NATO Security through Science programme will focus the combined scientific communities of the Partner and NATO countries on key security concerns of common interest, in particular the defence against terrorism.

4.3.6. Maritime and harbor security are important issues for Allies and Partners alike, including all those bordering on the Black and Caspian Seas. NATO will explore, in consultation with interested Partners, whether and how PfP actions could add value to those Partners' co-operative efforts in these areas. Any such actions would complement other international efforts, and would need to be tailored to the needs of all those Partners and of regional co-operation between them.

4.3.7. The international community is faced with challenges posed by transnational organised crime and its potential links with terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Building on its own expertise, and where it can add value, NATO will explore possibilities for PfP co-operation in the field of border security, particularly in connection with the fight against various forms of illegal trafficking, particularly in arms. NATO's efforts in this field will be regional in nature, will be in line with the constitutional framework of member states, and will be designed to complement the work of police institutions and the initiatives of other organisations, such as the EU and OSCE.



III. ENHANCING SUPPORTING TOOLS

5. NATO will further develop and adapt tools designed to support political dialogue and practical co-operation:

5.1. A targeted Public Diplomacy effort will be essential in informing Partner public opinion about objectives and priorities of Partnership, in particular those related to domestic reform. Effective communication means will be employed, including high-visibility Flagship Events, involving high-level representatives of NATO and Allied nations as well as key personalities and broad audiences in Partner countries. Seminars and conferences in Partner countries will reflect NATO's agreed objectives and priorities for the Euro-Atlantic Partnership. The use of the Contact Point Embassy mechanism in pursuit of Partnership objectives and priorities will also be optimized.

5.2. PARP, in addition to its key role in fostering military interoperability, will be adapted to better correspond to Partnership's overall objectives and priorities, such as to support defence reform, defence institution building and the fight against terrorism.

5.3. Following the decisions to be taken at Istanbul with regard to Partnership, Allies will consider reviewing the EAPC/PfP committee structure to ensure an effective and efficient support to the enhanced Partnership tools.

5.4. The PfP Partnership Work Programme and the EAPC Action Plan will be replaced by a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan (EAPWP), a single management and information tool, covering all areas of Partnership and providing coherent politico-military guidance on all aspects of Partnership work.

5.5. NATO funding arrangements for EAPC and PfP activities will be harmonized and adapted to increase the flexibility in responding to Partners' individual requests for subsidies and to help ensure a broad participation of Partners in priority events and activities.

5.6. The NATO/PfP Trust Fund policy will ensure greater flexibility and efficiency in helping Partners to manage the consequences of defence reform, including destruction of surplus munitions. This will include Partners taking the lead in developing and implementing PfP Trust Fund projects, in accordance with agreed procedures.

IV. RESOURCES

6. To ensure effective and efficient implementation of Partnership's existing programmes and new initiatives, Allies will review the size and distribution of NATO's budgetary and human resources devoted to the planning and execution of co-operation programmes and activities in NATO HQ and the military headquarters, in the light of Partnership objectives, geographical and substantive priorities, and other outreach programmes pursued by the Alliance. In this regard, re-prioritization and possible re-allocation of existing resources will become necessary.

7. Bilateral support of, and contribution to, Partnership programmes and activities by Allies and willing Partners will be essential for ensuring the success of the refocusing and renewal of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership.

* Note: There are currently 10 recognized PfP training centres with different focus. The United States has recently designated the US Naval Post-Graduate School at Monterey as a PfP Training Centre to be focused on the Caucasus and Central Asia.